scale/network economies that would allow it to achieve sustainable profits in the near future; (2) can it provide service at significantly lower cost than existing competitors, or the ability to produce service that consumers value much more highly at similar costs (3) has it created new sources of powerful competitive advantages through major product, technology and/or process innovations that incumbent producers could not readily match. Uber is not merely seeking a share of a still-competitive market, but is openly pursuing global industry dominance. Thus if its success is to be judged welfare enhancing the evidence of profits, efficiency, competitive advantages and sustainable consumer gains would need to be clear-cut and powerful.
The first section of the paper evaluates Uber against these economic welfare tests based on data on actual Uber financial performance, driver compensation and the overall cost structure of the taxi industry that has been ignored in most of the public discussion of Uber. The central findings are that Uber has been incurring substantially larger losses than any other highly-valued Silicon Valley financed startup and lacks the scale/network economies that would be needed to rapidly achieve profitability in a competitive market, that Uber is a substantially less efficient producer of urban car services and has no significant sources of competitive advantage over the traditional operators it has been driving out of business. Uber's growth to date has depended on staggering levels of predatory investor subsidies, and while these may have provided some temporary benefits to consumers and drivers they are not sustainable, and they are more than offset by Uber's ongoing destruction of more efficient industry capacity.
The second question this paper addresses is whether Uber is explicitly seeking the type of quasi-monopoly industry dominance that could further reduce overall economic welfare. This is an industry structure question-will consumers be better off with an urban car service industry dominated by a single, largely unregulated private company than they were with a competitively fragmented industry where local cities exercised oversight over pricing, capacity, safety and consumer protection? The second section of the paper presents evidence showing that Uber has always been pursuing industry dominance, that monopoly power and the potential for sustainable rent-extraction has always been seen a major source of returns by the Silicon Valley venture capital community that funded Uber, that Uber's investors could not earn returns on their $13 billion investment without the ability to exploit anti-competitive market power, and that several features of Uber's business model that only provide limited value today would become substantially more important with quasi-monopoly industry dominance. The second section explains that Uber's business model represents a radical departure from past tech unicorns that have achieved industry dominance. In those cases the company's original growth was fueled by legitimate and powerful competitive efficiency advantages, and its ability to achieve dominance was due to legitimate and powerful scale and/or network economies. Uber's growth cannot be explained by large competitive advantages or scale/network economies. Its rapid growth and the industry dominance it is pursuing have been entirely artificial, powered by its predatory investor subsidies.
The second section also explains that Uber's objective is not merely a dominant market position, but full control of the laws and regulations governing the urban car service industry, which would allow Uber to maximize its ability to exploit anti-competitive market power. Uber's pursuit of market control goes well beyond the type of industry structure changes consistent with past transport deregulation; it would eliminate the ability of cities to exercise any oversight over the taxi operations that are a component of urban transport infrastructure, and it would eliminate any protections for consumers and drivers from the market power abuses that could follow the elimination of competition. The second section discusses past efforts to deregulate taxis and other transport modes in order to highlight the more extreme nature of Uber's market control objective, and to document that even more limited taxi industry changes never produced any meaningful improvements in efficiency, pricing or service.
The third question this paper addresses is how Uber could actually achieve the industry dominance and market control it is pursuing given uncompetitive economics and given the failure of all past efforts to reduce legal/regulatory constraints to improve economic welfare. As to be expected for a company with its extraordinary growth and valuation, Uber has received an extraordinary amount of press coverage since 2010. But why has that press coverage been almost complete devoid of objective evidence about Uber's competitive economics or financial performance? Why has there been no media analysis or discussion of the pros and cons of longstanding industry regulations or the possible implications for taxi users if Uber' achieved the quasi-monopoly industry dominance it has been openly pursuing?
The third section presents evidence that Uber has always had a highly original, but strong and coherent strategy for pursuing market control. The foundation of this strategy was copied directly from a major taxi deregulation program developed in the 1990s by pro-corporate/libertarian-oriented think tanks in pursuit of the same complete elimination of all public oversight over urban taxi service that Uber's investors are seeking. The think tank strategy correctly recognized that the transfer of control over taxi markets from local citizens and government to private investors was a political decision. Its campaign to achieve these changes used techniques that have proven successful in political battles and reframed the discussion of how to best structure taxi competition away from empirical evidence about efficiency and consumer welfare into an emotive, tribal us-versus-them moral battle, where analytical debate and compromise was not possible. Uber's political narrative was embraced and amplified by tech industry analysts and journalists since it valorized tech innovators as the avatar of economic progress, and provided a self-contained explanation of how Uber would inevitably emerge as a prominent, powerful company after disrupting a backward industry just as Amazon and Google had. Uber supplemented its narrative by establishing a hyper-ruthless corporate culture, and publicizing a variety of actions demonstrating that local governments had no ability to enforce longstanding industry regulations, and that any resistance to its eventual dominance and industry control would be futile. (IA) Uber has been experiencing billions in operating losses, margins have not been rapidly improving and Uber's growth to date could not have occurred without billions in predatory investor subsidies, (IB) Uber is a less efficient, higher cost producer of urban car services than existing operators (IC) Growth will not eliminate Uber's cost disadvantage as urban car service operations have very limited scale economies and no network economies (ID) Claims that Uber "innovations" created major sustainable competitive advantages are not supported by industry evidence (IE) Uber fails all three of the tests of whether its growth will increase overall economic welfare 2. Is Uber explicitly seeking the type of quasi-monopoly industry dominance that could further reduce industry efficiency and overall economic welfare? (2A) Uber's investors have always recognized they cannot earn significant returns on their investment without the artificial anti-competitive market power that quasi-monopoly industry dominance would create (2B) Uber's investors have not been pursuing deregulation, but the much broader objective of full market control, which requires rejecting the concepts that taxis are part of urban transport infrastructure and that consumers benefit from competition (2C) The case of Amazon illustrates the difference between unicorns based on strongly competitive economics and companies like Uber where returns fundamentally depend on anti-competitive market power (2D) Historical evidence clearly shows that more modest taxi deregulation efforts than Uber is pursuing never helped consumers or improved industry efficiency 3. How can Uber achieve unregulated industry dominance given uncompetitive economics and given that all past efforts to eliminate legal/regulatory constraints failed to improve economic welfare?
(3A) Unlike any previous startup, Uber organized its business development along the lines of a political campaign, following the approach laid out for a 1990s taxi deregulation campaign by libertarian think tanks (3B) Uber adopted the think tank propaganda approach (almost word-for-word) as the foundation for its market control battle (3C) Uber's PR/propaganda narrative was powerfully amplified by the media (3D) Uber's willingness to exercise ruthless, raw power was a key component of its political battle for market control and fully aligned with its overall business strategy Conclusion-Would Uber's anticipated success in dominating and controlling urban car service markets increase industry efficiency and overall economic welfare?
1. Has Uber's rapid growth towards industry dominance has increased industry efficiency and overall economic welfare?
(1A) Uber has been experiencing billions in operating losses, margins have not been rapidly improving and Uber's growth to date could not have occurred without billions in predatory investor subsidies, The Uber business model includes two segregated but interrelated components: "corporate Uber" and its "independent drivers" following a structure that traditional operators have used since the 1970s. 5 Previously, industry production had been fully integrated and drivers had either been employees of taxi fleet companies, or standalone owner/operators. The post-70s business model converted taxi companies into vehicle leasing businesses; drivers became independent contractors. 6 Drivers at traditional taxi companies pay a fixed lease fee for each shift operated (covering the costs of the vehicle, dispatching and other centrally provided services), and must also pay for gas and other direct operating costs, and collect all passenger fares and tips. Uber takes a percentage of passenger fares from drivers, but Uber drivers must pay all vehicle costs (ownership, insurance and maintenance) that traditional taxi drivers do not have to cover. As a separate legal entity Uber (like taxi lessors) only reports financial results for the "corporate" component of its business model, but neither component can survive unless both components are economically viable, and competitiveness can only be analyzed in terms of the overall business model.
As a private company, Uber is not required to publish financial reports in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) but on four separate occasions the business press has reported selected financial results that Uber has shared with investors. The first set included data for 2012, 2013 and the first half of 2014, although only EBITDAR contribution (before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) was shown, not the true (GAAP) profit that publically traded companies report. 8 The second set included tables of GAAP profit data for full year 2014 and the first half of 2015; 9 the third and fourth sets included summary 5 The shift to independent contracting was first allowed in Boston in 1974 , Chicago in 1975 , San Francisco and Philadelphia in 1978 , New York and Cleveland in 1979 EBITDAR contribution data for the first half 10 and third quarter 11 of 2016. There has been no public report of results for the fourth quarter of 2015.
Exhibit 1 summarizes available data from 2013 through the first half of 2016. Data after 2013 shows total passenger payments (fares plus tips) and the portion of those payments retained by drivers which must cover the cost of vehicle ownership, insurance and maintenance, fuel, credit card and license fees as well as health insurance and take home pay; the balance is Uber's total revenue. Exhibit 2 shows the GAAP results for the full year ending September 2015 based on the published numbers and an estimated quarterly split of published 2nd half 2014 results. Exhibit 3 compares first half 2016 results to 2014-15 results. 20/uber-s-loss-exceeds-800-million-in-third-guarter-on-1-7-billion-in-net-revenue meaning 2016 GAAP losses would easily exceed $3 billion. 12 Thus Uber's current operations in 2015 and 2016 depended on over $5 billion in subsidies, funded out of the $13 billion in cash its investors have provided. In the first half of 2015 Uber passengers were only paying 78% of the actual cost of their trips and 41% of the costs Uber incurred; Uber's growth was driven by its ability to capture share from competitors who had to cover 100% of their costs out of passenger fares. Many other Silicon Valley funded startups lost money at first, but losses of this magnitude are unprecedented. Previously, the worst 12 month profit performance was recorded by Amazon in 2000, when it lost $1.4 billion on $2.8 billion in revenue, but this negative 50% margin was a far cry from Uber's negative 143%, and Amazon responded by firing more than 15 percent of its workforce, and reached P&L breakeven in the 4th quarter of 2001. 13 2015 was Uber's fifth year of operations; at that point in its history Facebook was achieving 25% profit margins.
14 Since Uber's valuation is based on its claim that its business model can produce profitable growth on a global scale, these aggregate corporate results are the most appropriate starting point for the evaluation of that business model. There have been numerous unsubstantiated (and unverifiable) The 2012-2016 data in these tables provides no evidence that Uber's rapid growth is driving the magnitude of steady margin improvements that would be needed to achieve breakeven and sustainable financial returns. Uber corporate revenue for the year ending June 2015 was over 500% higher than the year ending June 2014, but the EBITDAR margin barely changed, moving from negative 115% to negative 108%. Uber's EBITDAR contribution margin improved from negative 108% in the first half of 2015 to negative 62% in the first half of 2016, but this margin improvement is entirely explained by cuts in driver compensation. As shown in Exhibit 3, Uber only allowed drivers to retain 77% of each passenger dollar in 2016, down from 82% in 12 Under GAAP accounting rules these operating P&L numbers could not include any of the operating losses of Uber China (which began operating in 2014) since this was operated under a separate ownership structure and Uber only had a minority shareholding. 
2014-15
16 . If drivers had retained 82% of 2016 passenger payments, Uber's EBITDAR contribution would have been negative $1.7 billion, and its EBITDAR margin would have been negative 110%. Uber's EBITDAR margin did not improve in 2016 because of increased efficiency or scale economies; the company had simply made the unilateral decision to transfer $1 billion in cash from labor to capital. Assuming that the unusual spike in EBITDAR margin in the first half of 2014 (157%) was due to 2013 expenses not recognized for accounting purposes until 2014, Uber has been steadily producing EBITDAR margins worse than negative 100% since 2013, without any evidence that its fares will soon be able to cover the costs of providing the service.
The industry dominance that Uber's investors are pursuing cannot be welfare enhancing unless Uber can demonstrate that it can provide service on a basis that is sustainably profitable, provides a strong return on the capital its investors have provided, and can produce service substantially more efficiently than the incumbent providers it is trying to displace. The financial data in these tables show that Uber operations are staggeringly unprofitable, profitability is not rapidly improving, and its growth to date must be seen as the result of predatory pricing 7 against incumbents who have lower costs but need to charge fares that cover the entire cost of trips and lack the financial strength to withstand years of below-cost pricing subsidized by Silicon Valley billionaires. As one financial analyst observed "... [people] wonder why Uber keeps raising so much money...The answer is that Uber is using cash as a competitive weapon. When a competitor enters an Uber market, one investor in an Uber-competitor says, Uber immediately and radically cuts its prices. Uber then happily loses money on each ride, knowing that the new competitor, with inferior scale, will lose even more money on each ride. Uber bleeds the competitor until the competitor realizes that Uber will do whatever it takes to crush it. The competitor then often gives up and withdraws -and Uber raises its prices again."
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Aggressive below-cost pricing by a new market entrant only improves consumer welfare if the new entrant has efficiency and/or scale advantages that would allow it to quickly achieve sustainable profits large enough to recoup the short-term losses. The following section considers whether Uber could ever achieve the powerful and sustainable competitive efficiency advantages needed to reverse these huge losses.
(1B) Uber is a less efficient, higher cost producer of urban car services than existing operators To achieve dominance in a competitive market, a new entrant would need to find ways to provide service at substantially lower costs than existing operators based on efficiency advantages that incumbents could not readily match. The costs that Uber needs to undercut are summarized in Exhibit 4, which presents the cost structure breakdown of traditional urban car service operators, with each cost component expressed as a percentage of total passenger revenue. The first three columns are based on actual cost data from recent Seattle, San Francisco 2015/05/18/uber-new-uberx-tiered-commission-30 -percent/ Predatory pricing occurs where a firm (1) sets prices "below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs," and (2) the firm's predatory pricing creates "a dangerous probability" of eliminating competition and ultimately allowing the firm to recoup losses through supra-competitive pricing. Brooke Grope Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993) . "Predatory pricing" rcovers the case where a producer of a standardized product sets unprofitably low price levels in the shortterm in the expectation that its stronger financial base allows it to force financially weaker competitors out of the market. This paper uses the broader concept of "predatory competition" in order to accomodate the analogous practice where the stronger firm operates unprofitably higher capacity (or offers unprofitably higher product quality) in the short term to achieve the same ends. In all cases, discussions of Uber predation in this paper are assumed to meet the Brown & Williamson standards that they were motivated by the "dangerous probability" of eliminating competition and that Uber had reasonable expectations that it could recoup the costs of the predatory behavior once a dominant position was established. 18 Pre-tax earnings are even lower since workman's compensation, health insurance and some miscellaneous expenses must be covered out of take-home pay. Recognizing that big city taxi drivers are forced to work much longer hours than typical drivers, this data is consistent with Census Bureau analysis which estimated the average wages in the broad category of taxi and limousine driver as $32,444 per year and $13.25 per hour (in 2015 dollars). Under the traditional industry cost function, 33% of total costs are paid by the taxi owner (the 18% vehicle costs and the 15% corporate costs). As illustrated in Exhibit 5, under the Uber business model, the 18% vehicle costs are shifted to drivers so Uber is only paying the 15% corporate costs, while drivers pay 85% of total costs. However applying traditional taxi cost breakdown percentages assumes Uber and traditional efficiency levels are identical. While Uber has not disclosed its actual unit costs, if one observes its operating practices one can readily conclude that it is much less efficient, and has higher costs than traditional car service operators in every category, except for fuel and fees where no operator can achieve a cost advantage. The breakdown of Uber's structural cost/efficiency disadvantage is summarized in Exhibit 6. Higher vehicle costs. It is inconceivable that hundreds of thousands of independent, poorly financed Uber drivers Uber could ever achieve lower vehicle ownership, financing, licensing and maintenance costs than professional fleet managers at traditional taxi/limo companies, or do a better job balancing long-term asset costs against local market revenue potential. 22 Uber fares must also cover the cost of the higher quality vehicles it often requires, and must cover the risk that drivers (who Uber can fire at will) will be saddled with lease obligations they can no longer meet. Shifting operating costs and capital risk from Uber's investors onto its drivers does not eliminate them from the overall business model, and makes them higher.
Structurally higher driver take-home pay. The portion of passenger fares retained by Uber drivers must be split between a "base wage" comparable to the take home pay of traditional drivers (58% of the traditional cost structure), and "vehicle cost" compensation (18% of the traditional cost structure), covering the added costs drivers bear under the Uber model, as shown in Exhibit 5. Uber needed extraordinary traffic and revenue growth in order to fuel the growth of its unprecedented $68 billion financial valuation. This growth (documented in Exhibits 1-3) would have been impossible without offering base wage premiums large enough to get hundreds of thousands of drivers to sign up with Uber, but these wage premiums increased losses and the size of its structural cost disadvantage. As will be discussed below in the context of the industry's demand peaking problem, neither Uber nor any other operator using independent contractors can offset a structural driver and vehicle cost disadvantage by significantly improving driver efficiency (the ratio of revenue miles to total miles driven on a given shift).
The magnitude of Uber's driver cost disadvantage has been reduced somewhat by its exploitation of information asymmetries.
23 Drivers for traditional operators had never needed to understand the true vehicle costs and financial risks they needed to deduct from gross revenue in order to estimate their actual take home pay; ongoing Uber claims about higher driver pay deliberately misrepresented gross receipts as net take-home pay, and failed to disclose the substantial financial risk its drivers faced since Uber could cut their pay or terminate them at will, even if they were locked into long-term vehicle financing obligations. Uber claimed "[our} driver partners are small business entrepreneurs demonstrating across the country that being a driver is sustainable and profitable...the median income on UberX is more than $90,000/year/driver in New York and more than $74,000/year/driver in San Francisco" 24 even though it had no drivers with earnings 22 "Outsourcing to individual contractors means that on an aggregate basis efficiency is lost. For example, rather than having the bulk purchase bargaining power of a major corporate, Uber drivers must negotiate everything from car lease contracts, insurance, fuel prices and cleaning services individually....That makes the overall costs of servicing the customer base higher, which will eventually feed through to prices. 24 Uber was claiming that its drivers made more than double the actual earnings of traditional New York taxi drivers, and more than the average wages of workers in the tech industry, https://newsroom.uber.com/an-anything close to these levels. After these claims were readily debunked Uber responded with allegedly "academic" research (which Uber co-authored and paid for) which claimed Uber drivers earned more than traditional taxi drivers but made no effort to calculate actual net earnings, and concealed the fact that Uber salaries were massively subsidized while traditional taxi salaries were constrained by actual passenger revenues. 27 In January 2017, the federal Trade Commission fined Uber $20 million for deceptive advertisements about potential driver earnings and vehicle leasing terms. 28 In mid-2015, after hundreds of thousands of drivers were locked in to vehicle financial obligations, Uber eliminated driver incentive programs and reduced the driver share of each passenger dollar by one-third. 29 This transfer from Uber drivers to Uber investors produced the 2016 margin improvement shown in Exhibit 3, but also eliminated much (if not all) of the economic incentive that got drivers to switch to Uber in the first place. An external study of actual driver revenue and expenses in Denver, Houston and Detroit in late 2015, estimated actual net earnings of $10-13/hour, at or below the earnings from the studies in Seattle, Chicago, Boston and New York and found that Uber was still recruiting drivers with earnings claims that reflected gross revenue, and did not mention expenses. 30 Multiple news reports indicate drivers are having enormous difficulty making ends meet given Uber's current commission levels. 31 33 , and no one has produced any evidence that the Uber business model can achieve major margin improvements as it grows. No one in the history of urban car services has ever observed economies that drove high levels of concentration in individual markets or allowed individual companies to rapidly expand into other cities, much less the economies needed to expand globally. Exhibit 7 summarizes scale/network economy issues for each major cost category. 115-16 (1996) could increase if more off-peak and backhaul passengers could be found, but revenue productivity is not a function of company size. There are very limited economies tied to the minimum scale required to cover the cost of dispatching services but Uber's business model precludes the efficiencies integrated operators can achieve some vehicle economies such as volume purchasing of vehicles and insurance and the use sophisticated systems to optimize asset acquisition and utilization against volatile demand patterns.
Uber's economics are fundamentally different from other well-known startups that successfully used scale economies to grow into profitability. These were companies in fields such as social media or online retailing whose purely digital products could be expanded globally (and into new markets) at extraordinarily low marginal cost. Unlike an urban car service provider, direct labor was a tiny component of these companies overall cost structure, and most had no competition (entirely new products like Ebay or Facebook) or were facing competition with enormously higher direct operating costs (online retailers vs. brick-and-mortar incumbents). Unlike digital companies, Uber actually faces negative expansion economies since each new market raises entirely unique competitive, recruitment, and political lobbying battles. The first markets Uber entered were presumably the ones it thought would be the easiest to penetrate; as the demographic/competitive/political challenges increase, Uber's unit expansion costs appear to have increased dramatically as it expanded to Europe and Asia.
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Uber also has no potential to exploit the network economies that some purely digital companies used to drive major profit improvements. In these cases (EBay's exchange market, Google's search function, Facebook's social media product) the development of a strong user base makes the product significantly more efficient and more attractive to other users. 35 This locks-in existing users, fuels growth, and makes it nearly impossible for later entrants with smaller user bases to compete. Neither Uber's ordering app, nor the ordering apps of other operating companies create these network economies or locks-in users the way Ebay and Facebook and Google can. 6 In a competitive market people will use the app of companies like Uber or American Airlines if they can profitably provide good prices and service, but no one will abandon Yellow Cab or JetBlue just because a lot of other people have the bigger company's app on their phones.
(1D) Claims that Uber "innovations" created major sustainable competitive advantages are not supported by industry evidence Uber claims to be a highly "innovative" company but has never provided evidence that any of these "innovations" constitute powerful competitive advantages that traditional operators could never match, or that they have significantly reduced any of the costs identified in Exhibits 4. This section will briefly address some of the major claims Uber supporters have made while attempting to justify the growth of market share and valuation in terms of competitive efficiency.
Independent contracting is not an Uber innovation and actually reduces service and efficiency. As noted, the use of independent contractor drivers is not an Uber innovation, although Uber takes the longstanding practice a step further by requiring drivers to provide and maintain vehicles. Independent contracting is critical to Uber's business model; a 2016 Morgan Stanley investor prospectus prepared at Uber's request said that any changes that gave its full time drivers the same legal rights of other corporate employees "could have a material adverse effect on its ability to operate its business." 38 Independent contracting split integrated car services into separate leasing (owner/driver) and transport (driver/customer) businesses; this made it much more difficult for customers to reward or punish taxi firms based on trip quality 39 and reduced taxi owner incentives to improve service and efficiency 40 . In most cities owners lease cars on a 12 hour (or longer) basis and get the same lease (or "gate") fee regardless of how many fares the driver can collect. The combination of low pay ($12-17/hour) and the exhausting (60-75 hour) work weeks needed to cover lease fees destroys driver incentives to work harder or better. 41 Uber's higher pre-2016 driver base wages mitigated these service problems but made its costs uncompetitive; if Uber can force its drivers to accept the same low wages and long hours, these service problems would inevitably return. More importantly, independent contracting eliminates the ability to optimize capital assets, to maximize vehicle and labor utilization, and to train drivers to operate as efficiently as possible. A detailed study of taxi operations in Chicago documented how the system driven by the intuition of hundreds of isolated individuals led to huge variations in revenue productivity, and that taxi companies could not maximize capacity at peak periods and had no way to train or weed out underperforming drivers.
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Airlines and railroads and trucking firms and urban transit systems depend on highly integrated systems that are designed to optimize the efficiency and profitability of the entire network. Independent contracting destroys normal transport economics by making integrated network management impossible, and by incentivizing drivers to avoid trips and shifts (i.e. off-peak service, trips with empty backhauls) that have less gross revenue but would increase the total profitability of an integrated operator. Uber's App is not an important innovative breakthrough. Many consumers seem to like Uber's ordering/dispatching app but it does not represent a major, sustainable technological innovation 44 that could not possibly explain massive industry transformation. Internet based ecommerce had long allowed consumers who had pre-registered address and credit card data with a vendor to rapidly purchase items; Associates,13 (2012) . Because of the long hours required to cover lease fees, studies showed that drivers were highly risk averse and prone to exhaustion; instead of continuing to drive whenever demand was strong they drove only the hours needed to reach daily revenue targets. Camerer, C, Babcock, L, Loewenstein, G., & Thaler, R. 101(5), 1912-1932 (2011) . 42 Study based on 10.6 million trips over an 8 month period in 2013 found much wider variances in driver productivity than a system proactively managing driver scheduling could achieve. 15-20% of all drivers made. 5 or fewer trips over a 7-11 hour shift versus 12-18 trips for most drivers; while the median driver made net income of $115 a day, 20% of drivers made net income of $30 a day or less, while 20% made $187 a day or more. Chicago Business Affairs and Consumer Protection, supra note 20 at 3-2 to 3-6. A New York study also found very high variance among driver earnings; Schaller & Gilbert, supra note 38. 43 For examples of how Uber's system does not maximize driver revenue potential see Rosenblat, Alex, The Truth About How Uber's App Manages Drivers, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, Apr 2016. https://hbr.orq/2016/04/the-truth-about-how-ubers-app-manaqes-drivers "Conflating Uber with the broad advance of technology is just wrong, and it's also exactly what Uber wants us to do." Slee, Tom, Why Canada Should De-Activate Uber, WHIMSLEY, 22 Nov 2014. http://tomslee.net/2014/11/why-canada-should-de-activate-uber. html Uber was one of the first companies to extend this feature to smartphones but these credit card billing advantages were immaterial to overall car service cost competiveness, and did not create any network economies. The app did not create a sustainable advantage since this software can be (and has been) readily replicated by competitors; in a competitive market the costs of switching away from Uber's app are very low. Hundreds of other consumer industries have migrated from telephone ordering to internet/smartphone ordering (pizza delivery, airline booking), but there is not a single case where this had any material impact on industry competition, much less created tens of billions of dollars in corporate value.
Uber's "surge pricing" approach does not improve efficiency, Uber's surge pricing 46 cannot achieve the major efficiency gains that variable pricing systems have achieved in airlines, hotels and other travel industries because urban car service market dynamics are totally different. Unlike taxi customers, people buy airplane tickets and hotel rooms well in advance, and can easily get complete information about all of the price/schedule options available in the market. This allows airlines and hotels to increase profitability, by increasing sales to price sensitive customers (who can fill otherwise empty seats and rooms), and by eliminating the high cost of capacity that would only get used at peak periods. But research has long demonstrated that taxi demand is inelastic in the very short-term, and the timing of demand is highly inelastic (people want a cab at a very specific time)
47 so very short-term fare changes will not change demand patterns, drive improved utilization or increase total revenue. All forms of urban transport have similarly inelastic demand; the Long Island Rail Road has had peak/off-peak pricing for a hundred years but rush hour is still rush hour. No level of taxi discount will get anyone to shift their Saturday night plans to midday Tuesday. Airline revenue management systems improve market efficiency because they incorporate marketwide supply/demand data and operate in a timeframe long enough to improve the matching of customers with capacity. Uber simply responds to fluctuations in passenger requests within narrow geographic and time periods.
48 and (without prior warning) can increase taxi fares up to eight times normal levels. An internal Uber study of its four largest US markets found that 21 % of all passengers paid surged prices. 49 Uber surge pricing is not based on data about total market demand, and cannot provide customers with any of the information about pricing or service options critical to improving capacity utilization. It cannot even tell people heading out on Saturday night what it will charge to take them home. Uber Surge pricing can be readily manipulated depending on whether Uber wants to increase (or minimize) driver earnings, limit wait times, or maximize its own revenue. 50 Uber claims that it does not use surge pricing to maximize revenue, but solely to 45 SeamlessWeb, founded in 2000 appears to have been the pioneer startup; it focused on providing meals and car services for Manhattan firms (lawyers, bankers) who would be willing to pay premium prices to rapidly place orders on short notice, and especially prefered corporate billing to cash payments. increase the supply of drivers at peak periods, but external studies show that it redistributes existing driver supply but does little to increase it. 51 Additionally, the sociological distribution of urban taxi demand is bipolar; 43% is from people earning less than $20,000 (and 55% from people earning less than $40,000, most of whom do not have cars) while 35% is from people with incomes greater than $100,000.
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Studies show most of the lower-income demand is driven by jobs and services that cannot easily be reached by public transit, or trips at hours when public transit does not operate. Unlike airline pricing systems, surge pricing does not offer price-sensitive customers attractive alternatives; it simply prices them out of the market. A pro-Uber paper by a major libertarian think tank dismissed this huge portion of taxi demand as "people who do not really need a ride." 53 Uber's competitive service advantages are totally due to massive investor subsidies, and nothing in Uber's business model solves the industry's major service problems. Many users consider Uber's service qualitydriver courtesy and professionalism, car cleanliness, greater car availability at peak times-to be superior to traditional car service providers. This market perception is entirely explained by unsustainable subsidies that boost driver compensation and car capacity above the levels that could be justified by passenger fares. Much of the value incorrectly attributed to Uber's "innovative app" is actually due to the artificially inflated level of car capacity the app often shows; if the app only showed the much smaller number of cars that could cover their full operating costs out of the fares charges, no one would care about the quality of the user interface.
The traditional industry's deficiencies in these areas are due to inherent taxi market structural problems, not to any obvious inefficiencies or excess profits that new competitive market entry could solve. As noted, driver professionalism and car cleanliness problems are caused by low pay and the use of independent contractors 54 and Uber's business model does not solve these problems. The problems of car availability when demand is highest (you can't get a cab after dinner on Saturday night, or after your late evening arrival at LaGuardia, or when it is raining), and poor service to lower-density neighborhoods (including but not limited to low income neighborhoods) exist because the true cost of providing peak period and low-density neighborhood service is substantially higher than the fares taxi riders expect (or are willing) to pay and nothing in Uber's business model reduces the cost of these services.
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Every form of urban transport faces the problem of extreme demand peaks that are very expensive to serve; the taxi demand peak occurs in the evening, with especially extreme peaks on Friday and Saturday night. This is largely driven by (largely lower income) people working evening and night shifts when transit service is unavailable and people travelling to dining and entertainment venues. 56 The profitability of individual taxi 54 Schaller & Gilbert supra note 38. 55 As with driver salaries, Uber has paid for and publicized "independent" analysis that claims that it provides better service in low-income neighborhoods than traditional taxis, but failed to explain how Uber could economically provide better service, and concealed the existence of the subsidies that did explain it. Alba, D., Uber Cheaper, Faster Than Taxis In Low-Income Neighborhoods, WIRED 20 Jul 2015. http://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-cheaper-faster-taxis-low-income-neighborhoods/ A San Francisco Taxi Commission study found that Monday-Thursday between 6 and 10 pm only 35% of calls to dispatch centers actually produced a taxicab, while on Friday and Saturday nights the no-show rate reached 95% San Francisco Taxi Commission Taxicab Medallion Public Convenience and Necessity Report, 15-25. (Feb 2007) . In Manhattan, 15% of all taxi ridership occurs within two seven hour blocks on Friday and Saturday nights, and an additional 13% occurs within four hour evening blocks Monday thru Thursday. trips varies widely depending on the associated empty backhaul costs, but taxi operators (including Uber) have no way to know the exact backhaul cost associated with each trip in advance, and no way to adjust fares in line with true trip costs. The true cost of an early morning airport trip (which will have an empty backhaul because no flights have arrived) is nearly double the cost of a later afternoon trip, when return fares are ready and waiting, but both trips are priced identically. The economic cost of trips to neighborhoods with low demand density (where backhauls are rare) will be much higher than trips within a city's high demand core (downtown, shopping/entertainment districts, wealthier residential areas).
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Taxi drivers struggling to make a living often refuse trips to these low-density neighborhoods, a problem that can be exacerbated by fear of crime and racial prejudice. 58 If taxi companies set fares in line with true service costs, prices to low density neighborhoods would likely increase 50-100% and peak period prices would be 3-5 times normal levels. 59 This would price taxis out of the reach of many current users, reducing both total taxi demand and overall economic welfare.
Without strong car service profits, Uber cannot grow the market or expand into other industries. Some Uber supporters have defended its rich valuation by asserting that Uber could dramatically grow market demand beyond historical levels, but ignored the subsidies that have driven all growth to date and didn't seem to understand that the lower prices needed to expand demand required both superior (and continually improving) efficiency and powerful scale economies. 60 Bill Gurley, one of Uber's original investors, took the "magical market growth" claim even further, claiming that people trying to value Uber had to consider that they would drive prices so low that car ownership rates would plummet, and that Uber's growth potential should not defined by existing taxi/limo demand but by the size ($22 billion in San Francisco) of the entire ground transportation market. 61 Gurley did not disclose the magnitude of current losses and did not explain how Uber could ever profitably provide car service at prices competitive with public transit or private car ownership. 7-10 (2013) . These studies based on actual ridership can badly understate the actual underlying demand peak, as they do not include people who give up hope of finding a cab, or know from experience not to bother in the first place 57 For maps that illustrate the demand gap between core downtown/entertainment districts and low-density neighborhoods; Boston Taxicab Consultants Report, supra note 20 at 4-9; Abrams, R., Harris, S., Marton, D., Mauldin, C, Millard-Ball, A., Rothman, E. & Weinberger, R., Taxi 58 The New York Taxi and Limousine Commission investigated complaints of passenger complaints that drivers had refused to take them to their desired destination, as legally required, and found that almost all destinations were in very low crime areas, but were outer borough neighborhoods with a high likelihood of an empty backhaul. Schaller & Gilbert, supra note 39. Of course the TLC could not investigate cases (i.e. African-Americans) where the cab driver never stopped to see where the passenger wanted to go.. 59 If taxi companies provided drivers and fleets of vehicles that only operated during these 20-30 peak hours, peak fares would need to be high enough so that the vehicles could earn the same revenue as other vehicles operating 75-100 hours per week 6 "the introduction of Uber and Uber-style apps greatly increases the size of the world taxi market" Yglesias, Matthew, Why Uber just might be worth it at $18 billion, Vox , 7 Jun 2014. http://www.vox.eom/2014/6/7/5788558/why-uber-iust-miqht-be-worth-it-at-18-billion [since Uber and Lyft are in a] "vicious match for dominance across the globe, ride-sharing prices over all are sure to plummet" Manjoo, Farhad, With Uber, Less Reason to Own a Car, NEW YORK TIMES, 11 Jun 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/technoloqv/personaltech/with-ubers-cars-mavbe-we-dont-need-ourown, htm I? r=0 "Uber and Lyft have already pushed down fares and expanded availability, and Uber may achieve further improvements on both fronts in the coming years. In the process, they may significantly expand the overall market." Lee, 63 and the "driverless car" industry 64 ignore the fundamentally different economics of these businesses, and ignores the fact that Uber cannot expand into other, more competitive, lower-margin businesses unless it first finds the billions in P&L improvements needed to achieve profitability in its core car service business. Uber executive Emil Michaels claimed that its car services were just the starting point for expansion into a broad array of delivery and logistical services. "We always say that we deliver people in five minutes or less. Well, there are a lot of other things you can deliver in five minutes or less. This is the beginning of an on-demand lifestyle we're bringing to people." 65 Michaels' comment highlights the disconnect between Uber's claim that its "push a button, get a car" on-demand service was a major innovative breakthrough, and its inability to explain how it could profitably provide enough car capacity to insure immediate availability whenever that button was pushed. And just as Michaels did not explain how Uber could ever achieve sustainable profits in its core car service business, he did not explain how Uber would suddenly establish powerful competitive advantages over established, sophisticated logistical/delivery companies such as UPS or FedEx. To date, none of Uber's many attempts to expand into other "on-demand" services, such as UberEats, UberRush, UberFresh or UberEssentials have demonstrated any ability to expand outside of narrow niches, and none of the many other startups focused on "on-demand" services have become profitable, growing businesses. 66 . Uber has made "driverless cars" a top strategic priority in 2016, but there is no evidence that this drove its rapid valuation growth in prior years, and it is unclear why investors would wager billions on the prospect that Uber is more likely to dominate this business than competitors such as Google, Tesla, Toyota, Mercedes-Benz, Ford and General Motors. Additionally, all of these competitors can realize returns from investment in new software and manufacturing processes at each stage of development, while Uber gets no benefit until the (highly uncertain) point when maximum level of automation is achieved, 67 and the cost of drivers can be eliminated.
Uber's market entry will not allow consumers to recapture rents extracted via taxi medallions. Uber publicity often argued how tradeable taxi medallions were at the heart of the industry problems that Uber's market entry would address. 68 These medallions are competitively problematic and will not be defended here, but "The idea: Uber doesn't just set passengers up with drivers. It's a company starting to dream of becoming a logistical nervous system for cities." Lagorio-Chafkin, Christine, Resistance Is Futile, INC THE GUARDIAN, 3 Feb 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/technoloqy/2015/feb/03/are-driverless-cars-the-future-of-uber 65 "Kalanick and his inner circle of true believers predict a future in which all commercial vehicles are "Uberized": a time when it's not just your car service that appears on demand using Uber's smartphone app and software-it's your Chinese delivery and your UPS packages,too." Cushing, Ellen, The Smartest Bro in the Room, SAN FRANCISCO MAGAZINE, 21 QUARTZ, 4 Aug 2016. http://qz.com/747905/its-time-for-uber-to-show-its-more-than-iust-a-qlorified-taxi-company/ Lacy, Sara, The only Uber of anything is Uber, PANDO DAILY, 28 Jul 2015. https://pando.com/2015/07/28/homeioyonly-uber-is-uber/ also Griffith, supra note 14. 67 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration established five stages of car automation, based on categories originally defined by the Society of Automotive Engineers. Taxis would require drivers in each stage prior to category five ("full automation"). Levels Of Driving Automation Are Defined In New SAE International Standard J3016 http://www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated drivinq.pdf 68 Uber CEO Travis Kalanick is quoted as saying Uber is fighting "the taxi medallion evil empire" Greenhouse, Steven, Uber: On the Road to Nowhere, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Winter 2016. http://prospect.org/article/road-nowhere-3 "In exchange for all of this regulation, taxis have for decades held a government-backed monopoly. At the center of that bargain -and the debate over what form of transportation best serves the public -is the medallion... Uber counters that medallions have created a cartel that operates for its own benefit -and not in the best interests of the public" Badger, Emily, Taxi Uber falsely implied that their trading value represented an ongoing stream of wealth that had been extracted from consumers and drivers, and incorrectly claimed that eliminating medallions would allow consumers or workers to recapture this value 69 . Only three cities (New York, Boston and Chicago) ever saw medallions with any significant value 70 yet these cities had the same approximate fare levels, driver wages and service quality as other large US cities, and there is no evidence of any adverse consumer impacts concurrent with the recent run-up in medallion values. (1E) Uber fails all three of the tests of whether its growth will increase overall economic welfare Three tests were identified at the beginning of this paper as a basis for evaluating whether the displacement of incumbent industry competitors by a new market entrant would increase overall economic welfare. Uber fails all of them-it is nowhere close to earning sustainable profits in a competitive market and it lacks the powerful scale/network economies needed to quickly grow into profitability, it cannot produce car service more efficiently than the incumbents it has been driving out of business, and it has no powerful sources of sustainable competitive advantage.
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Uber has not created a totally new product or redefined the urban car service market; it is not "disrupting" incumbent operators with a totally new way of doing business 75 but is driving passengers from point A to point B in cars, just like traditional urban car service operators. Customers of traditional operators use a telephone to order a car, with the order relayed to a driver by a dispatcher; Uber customers use a smartphone to order a car, and the order is relayed by a computer. Smartphone ordering does not create huge, unmatchable cost or utilization advantages, or make customers willing to pay much higher prices. Uber has not reduced the high cost of peak service or solved any of the other major service or efficiency problems that traditional operators face. The evidence presented here supports the conclusion that Uber is a less efficient producer of urban car service than a reasonably well-run Yellow Cab company, and cannot significantly increase efficiency by exploiting major scale/network economies. Its growth to date has depended on staggering levels of predatory investor subsidies, and while these may have provided some temporary benefits to consumers and drivers they are not sustainable, and they are more than offset by Uber's ongoing destruction of more efficient industry capacity. Uber represents a radical departure from all of the previous Silicon Valley funded unicorns that have grown into large, powerful companies. Companies like Google, Amazon, Ebay and Facebook rose to dominant positions on the basis of powerful competitive efficiency advantages, and then to industry dominance on the basis of scale or network economies that turned their industries into "winner-take-all" games and created a powerful barrier to future competitive threats.. Those competitive advantages and scale/network economies created significant consumer benefits, although these net welfare gains were reduced somewhat by the ability to exploit market power once they had achieved industry dominance.
Uber's radical departure is that its business model skips the difficult first part of this equation, which requires creating a totally new product that consumers value, or finding major efficiency breakthroughs so consumers can enjoy an existing product at much lower cost. Instead of beating existing providers in the marketplace based on those advantages, Uber's investors provided $13 billion to fund predatory competition, beating those providers with price and service levels that were totally uneconomical. The urban car service industry had none of the economic characteristics of a "winner-take-all" industry, but Uber believed its $13 billion investment base would effectively turn it into one, and its demonstrated ability to use that investment base to overwhelm more efficient competitors would discourage future competitors from challenging its dominance. Uber's business model is focused entirely on the second part of the equation, the exploitation of anticompetitive market power 77 that industry dominance would create.
The Silicon Valley venture capital community that funded Uber has always been focused on the potential for outsized financial returns, and especially focused on companies that could achieve industry dominance on a global scale, supporting significant rent-extraction and supra-competitive profits. As PayPal founder Peter Thiel said "Always aim for a monopoly. It's one big transgressive idea, and you're not allowed to talk about it... From society's perspective, it's complicated. But from the inside, I always want to have a monopoly."
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Under this line of thinking, the type of robust market competition designed to ensure the efficient long-term allocation of capital is actually the enemy of capitalism, and needs to be vanquished. In an article entitled "Competition is for Losers" Thiel argued that "Americans mythologize competition and credit it with saving us from socialist bread lines. Actually, capitalism and competition are opposites. Capitalism is premised on the accumulation of capital, but under perfect competition, all profits get competed away."
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None of Uber's investors or senior managers ever thought that their pursuit of global industry dominance would be driven by superior competitive economics, and thus none of these investors or managers expressed any concern as Uber operated with uncompetitive costs and required multi-billion dollar subsidies to cover the growing operating losses documented in the first section of this paper. Instead of building a better mousetrap than incumbent operators, Uber's investors simply funding the predatory competition that would drive the people who actually provided the better mousetrap out of business. Monopoly rents on a global scale could certainly justify the financial risks inherent in a long-term $13 billion speculative investment. Venture capitalists would not have put $13 billion into a company fighting to achieve a reasonable market share based on marginal service and utilization advantages over established competitors in a commodity market. Benedict Evans, a partner at venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz summarized Uber's strategy as "Fascinating city-by-city algebra to make the numbers work, plus massive burn in a play to conquer the world."
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Sherwin Pishevar, formerly a managing director at Menlo Ventures, became an original investor in Uber because he believed the company's platform could provide the basis for sustainable rent-extraction and the company's model could scale globally. "Uber is building a digital mesh-a grid that goes over the cities," Pishevar says. "Once you have that grid running, in everyone's pockets, there is a lot of potential for what you can build as a platform. Uber is in the empire-building phase."
81 With previous startups, platforms (EBay's trading platform, Amazon's ecommerce platform, Google's search engine, Facebook's social network software) were key to the creation of the competitive advantages that fueled both growth and consumer benefits. In 2010 Kalanick was quoted saying "I'll stop at nothing to see Uber go to every major city in the US and the world" and by early 2011 he had "expelled from his inner circle anyone he thought might stand in the way of Uber's manifest destiny to conquer the world." 82 Uber's app platform did not create any material product or efficiency advantage and does not generate any scale or network economies 83 but if Uber achieves industry dominance it would serve as a barrier to new entry because taxi users everywhere would be forced to have it on their phones. It would also become a monopoly controller of all information about demand, capacity and pricing, driver employment and compensation. 4 (2B) Uber's investors have not been pursuing deregulation, but the much broader objective of full market control, which requires rejecting the concepts that taxis are part of urban transport infrastructure and that consumers benefit from competition Since its inception, Uber has understood that its biggest challenge was not the marketplace battle between Uber drivers and Yellow Cab drivers over local taxi passengers, but between Uber's Silicon Valley investors and local citizens over control of the laws and regulations governing the urban car service market. Given the billions in profit improvement Uber needs just to break even, its investors cannot take the risk that cities respond to Uber dominance by reimposing pricing and service requirements, or other steps designed to restore meaningful competition.
Many have incorrectly referred to Uber's objective as taxi deregulation. In past transport deregulation debates industry and government officials debated whether alternate industry structures (levels of competition and government oversight) would maximize overall economic welfare. 85 Past reforms considered the needs of operators (taxi owners and drivers needed to make money) but also recognized that unregulated taxis would underprovide welfare enhancing benefits such as safety, insurance and access to jobs and housing that were poorly served by public transit. In certain cases reforms designed to increase competition between independent providers subject to "level playing field" rules were judged to be the best way to increase industry efficiency and overall welfare, but the importance of the government oversight needed to protect the public interest in maximizing welfare was never questioned.
Uber's objective was not to eliminate aspects of government oversight that no longer improved taxi service, but to eliminate the idea that taxis were a part of transport infrastructure that governments had any right to exercise oversight over. Uber's objective was not to maximize competition subject to "level playing field" rules, but to seize control of the entire playing field and to eliminate meaningful competition. Uber was not Johnson, Bobbie, How to Get Away with Uber, MEDIUM, 22 Nov 2014 https://medium.com/matter/how-toget-awav-with-uber-75b406043733
Lagorio-Chafkin, supra note 62. 82 Stone, THE UPSTARTS, supra note 45, pp.7, 123, 153.. 83 Service advantages attributed to the app are actually due to the massive subsidies that fund the artificially low prices and increased service shown on the app. supra section 1D.
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This is the logic behind Pishevar's comment supra note 81. In a competitive market Uber's ordering app would be considered its "platform", but with quasi-monopolistic dominance "platform" would refer to its control of the rules that govern providers, customers and all other market participants. Control of a market is a "natural monopoly" even though the industry marketplace is not. White, A., & Weyl, E. G. Insulated platform competition (2012 presenting evidence showing how an unregulated monopoly provider would greater overall economic welfare than a competitive industry subject to regulations, it wanted to establish the absolute preeminence of its pursuit of shareholder returns over any public interest protecting competition, safety, consumer protection, employee rights, or any other welfare enhancing benefits. If urban car service could be transformed from urban transport infrastructure into a purely discretionary consumer good, like the theaters and restaurants, then governments could not object if the entire industry became the private property of Uber's Silicon Valley investors, or impose regulations designed to ensure that service was safe, affordable, and required to serve all citizens equally.
The unfettered freedom to exploit anti-competitive market power could rapidly improve Uber's profitability. Once meaningful alternatives were gone Uber could not only eliminate the driver pay premiums they needed to fuel growth but they could actually drive driver take-home pay below the $12-17 per hour level traditional operators had paid. As previously noted 86 , unilaterally imposed driver compensation cuts in 2016 have transferred roughly $1 billion from drivers to Uber's investors, while vehicle financing obligations prevent drivers from abandoning Uber for other employers. With full industry dominance, Uber could drive take-home pay (net of vehicle costs) even lower, while imposing strict employee-type scheduling controls on its "independent" drivers while still refusing to provide the pay and benefits employees are legally entitled to.
Other aspects of Uber's business model that do not create significant value in a competitive market offer significant rent-extraction potential with industry dominance, and by ignoring the adverse publicity they generated, Uber ensured they would be free to use them in the future. Surge pricing could be used much more aggressively without fear of competitive discipline. As noted previously, dominance would force anyone who might ever want a cab to carry Uber's app, and it would give Uber monopoly control of most critical industry data. 87 Uber could increase both utilization and revenue by unilaterally imposing much higher prices for peak period and low density neighborhood service, although this would effectively eliminate taxi service for a major segment of (mostly lower income) users. Dominance would also significantly enhance Uber's (already massive) political lobbying strength, making it harder for consumers to pursue legal/political remedies, and harder for potential new entrants to challenge any competitive abuses.
Uber's pursuit of market control directly follows Thiel's concept that that the interests of capital accumulators are fundamentally in conflict with the interests of consumers in competition, and that laws and regulations designed to protect competition or maximize overall economic welfare are illegitimate if they limit his unfettered freedom to accumulate capital. Uber and its investors have been pursuing a strategy that is diametrically opposed to the entire efficiency/resource allocation framework used in this paper. In the Uber worldview, the type of evidence presented here showing that Uber's growth has reduced industry efficiency, allocated resources to less productive uses and reduced overall economic welfare is of no consequence because consumers, the owners of taxi companies displaced by predatory behavior, or public officials concerned with the cost and quality of taxis service have no right to restrict Uber's efforts to accumulate more capital. The "winning" capital accumulators should be free to use raw power to take complete control of the market. Competition, and information as to whether markets are allocating resources efficiently, is for "losers."
(2C) The case of Amazon illustrates the difference between unicorns based on strongly competitive economics and companies like Uber where returns fundamentally depend on anti-competitive market power A comparison with Amazon illustrates how Uber's approach to corporate development represents a radical departure from past tech startups. Amazon, like Uber, was seeking to drive a massive set of incumbent competitors out of business in order to achieve long-term industry dominance. But Amazon targeted a book retailing industry that had high prices, high margins and high costs, while Uber cannot explain why it sees the opportunity for billions in profit (opportunities no one else in the 100 year history of motorized taxis had noticed) from an industry selling a commodity product with razor-thin margins that has already cut costs to the bone. Unlike Uber, there was active public discussion during Amazon's startup years about whether the efficiency and marketplace impacts of its technological/process breakthroughs would be large enough to both displace incumbent providers and produce sustainable profits, and Amazon proactively provided Supra notes 16 and 30. Supra note 78. Infra section 3D. outsiders with evidence that could be verified by objective outsiders who were expert in the relevant retailing, warehousing and ecommerce fields. These included the huge savings from eliminating "brick-and-mortar" retail locations, enormous scale economies in warehousing and distribution, sophisticated software that not only gave customers access to much greater product choice but dramatically simplified product search and identified customer-tailored buying suggestions, increased leverage with publishers and other suppliers, sophisticated programs (such as Amazon Prime) for establishing customer loyalty, and huge scale economies that allowed it to expand geographically and into new markets at negligible marginal cost once its basic selling and warehousing/distribution infrastructure was in place. The huge scale economies meant it could rapidly drive down unit costs as it grew, use rock-bottom prices to drive further growth (and huge consumer welfare benefits), and making it virtually impossible for existing (or new) entrants to ever match its efficiency levels.
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This is not to say that everything Amazon has ever done increased industry efficiency and consumer welfare; once Amazon had achieved profitable scale and expanded into a range of new markets, it worked aggressively to exploit aspects of market power and eliminate competitive threats. 90 The two key differences here are market growth fundamentally based on powerful economic advantages that also created consumer welfare benefits, and the use of powerful scale economies to establish dominance and entry barriers. Both Uber's market growth and anticipated dominance would be wholly based on predatory competition that created no sustainable consumer benefits. Uber needed a pre-lPO investment base that is over 1600 times larger than Amazon's because this magnitude of investment would be required to fund the years of predatory subsidies needed to achieve dominance in the absence of competitive advantages. Companies (like Amazon) that have powerful competitive efficiency advantages do not need investment bases this large because much of their growth can be funded from positive cash flow. Amazon welcomed outside scrutiny of its business model during its startup years because it had ample evidence of the economics that created consumer benefits. By contrast, Uber worked aggressively to intimidate journalists and other outsiders questioning the basis for their rapid growth. 91 Amazon moved quickly to become a public company and provide full transparency about its actual financial performance, 92 while Uber has avoided disclosing the data that would highlight its bleak financial performance 93 , and to date has not demonstrated any interest in exposing itself to the open scrutiny of capital markets.
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(2D) Historical evidence clearly shows that more modest taxi deregulation efforts than Uber is pursuing never helped consumers or improved industry efficiency As noted at the outset, this paper is addressing an industry structure question-will consumers be better off with an urban car service industry dominated by a single, largely unregulated private company than they http://qz.com/707947/investors-have-placed-a-one-way-bet-on-uber-which-made-us-want-to-fiqure-out-awav-to-short-it/ were with a competitively fragmented industry where local cities exercised oversight over pricing, capacity, safety and consumer protection issues? The question of taxi deregulation-involving milder changes to industry structure than Uber's owners are pursuing-has been considered multiple times, but when evaluated against economic welfare criteria using industry data, has always been rejected.
Economists cannot find any credible evidence that taxi deregulation would improve efficiency or consumer welfare. Academic economists in the 1970s and 80s had identified numerous ways that major reforms to railroad, airline, and trucking regulations 95 could directly improve industry efficiency and consumer welfare, but rejected the idea that taxi deregulation would produce similar benefits, because industry conditions were entirely different. It must be emphasized that actual airline, railroad and trucking deregulation (and the taxi deregulation considered at this time) was strictly limited to getting government staff out of the business of reviewing day-to-day tactical marketing decisions (pricing, capacity, service features) and eliminating artificial limits on the number of companies that could compete in a market. This approach to transport deregulation, as noted previously, recognized that government oversight was needed to ensure these industries maximized overall economic welfare, but reforms designed to increase competition within a "level playing field" framework could help achieve that objective. There was no attempt to eliminate (and many efforts to strengthen) legal and regulatory requirements related to antitrust, financial reporting, consumer protection, employee rights, bankruptcy and safety.
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The market control rules established by past transport regulatory regimes had been based on contemporary industry economics. When railroads had a monopoly of intercity freight and passenger service, owners could artificial market power over workers, shippers, and local communities and could also engage in ruinous rate wars and takeover battles that reduced the value of the industry to society as a whole. ICC market control rules were designed to limit destructive competition and extract some of the monopoly pricing power in order to fund protections for employees and less profitable local service. But technological and competitive changes upended the original assumptions about industry economics, and the regulations that had stabilized the industry now imposed huge deadweight costs (firemen on diesel locomotives, passenger and low-density freight services that were huge money losers) and prevented it from reallocating resources more efficiently. Similarly, the economic assumptions behind airline and trucking regulations from the era of DC-3s and unpaved rural roads were creating major inefficiencies in the era of Boeing 747s and Interstate Highways, and it was easy to demonstrate how certain regulatory practices directly reduced consumer welfare. 97 Unlike the current taxi industry situation, none of the powerful industry incumbents were advocating deregulation in order to increase concentration or pursue dominance. All of the "deregulatory" reforms of the 70s and 80s were designed to increase the number of competitors (and the ease of future entry) within a legal framework that ensured "level playing field" conditions and protected welfare-enhancing externalities (e.g. safety, competition, collective bargaining rights). 96 In reviewing the actual impacts of airline deregulation, Alfred Kahn, (one of the best-known academic advocates of deregulation, who dramatically liberalized airline regulations as chairman of the CAB) pointed to well-documented consumer pricing and operational efficiency gains, but bemoaned the failure to protect the robust competition needed to spur consumer benefits due to" the lamentable failure of the administration to enforce the policies of the antitrust laws" and the specific failure to prevent incumbents from using predatory pricing to attack market entrants. Kahn, Alfred E. Surprises of Airline Deregulation. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 78.2 (1988): 318-19. The author of this paper was personally involved with many aspects of transport deregulation throughout his career, from the restructuring of freight railroads in the 1970s to the initial development of global airline networks in 1990s to the radical consolidation of international aviation in recent years. 7 An academic paper that was widely quoted during debates over airline deregulation noted that PSA could profitably operate jets in California, and asked why the Civil Aeronautics Board demanded that United charge fares that were double what PSA charged. Levine, Michael, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Transportation Policy, 74 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1416-47 (1965) .
As incorporated into the
But it was quickly apparent that neither taxi technology, taxi operating economics, nor the role of taxis in urban transport had changed significantly since taxi regulations were widely introduced. Taxi pricing, entry and public safety regulations were established in order to ensure taxi owners and drivers could make a reasonable living from the available market revenue, while also ensuring fares were widely affordable, and that no operators could evade licensing, safety and insurance standards. 98 But no technological changes akin to jets or diesels or Interstate Highways had come along to render the original economic logic behind taxi regulation obsolete, and no one could find obvious evidence of PSA-type consumer pricing issues or diesel firemen type deadweight costs. Academics attacked the rare cases where a single company exercised quasi-monopoly dominance of a major city 99 but the vast majority of cities had significant competition. Individual industry participants in specific cities might be unhappy with how local regulators had balanced the burdens of the industry's structural cost problems (such as peaking, empty backhauls, and fuel price volatility) between passengers, drivers and fleet owners.
100 But no one could find clear evidence that any of the myriad local approaches to industry regulation clearly produced better overall results than the others.
The economists who examined and modelled the competitive dynamics of taxi markets in the 70s and 80s also identified a variety of specific reasons why unfettered entry and pricing freedom would not improve efficiency or consumer welfare, including demand inelasticity (price cuts would not stimulate sufficient new demand, reducing profits 101 ), price competition was unworkable in most situations (customers could not compare the prices of different cabs they could flag down 102 ; the economics of cab dispatching limited competition and could facilitate oligopoly pricing behavior among incumbents; 103 taxi operators have no way to equate price and marginal cost because of the backhaul problem; 104 and evidence that taxi markets did not naturally converge on an efficient equilibrium because of negative externalities 105 and an "empty core" problem that would lead to prices much higher than marginal cost.
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Nobody claimed that existing regulations had optimized industry performance, and everyone acknowledged industry problems, (poor profitability, long waits in peak periods) but none could be directly linked to specific regulatory rules, and the 285-350 (1971) . The central problem described in these articles (regulatory capture by a dominant incumbent) had been significantly mitigated by 1980. 100 In the 1970s taxi owners squeezed by much higher fuel costs and falling demand due to urban population shifts got regulators to approve the use of independent contractors, shifting most of the economic burden of these problems onto drivers. Supra notes 38 and 39. ORG.,118-20 (1987) . 105 Taxi firms cannot establish both the price and quality (wait time) of their product; adding capacity will reduce city-wide average wait times, but since the firm that adds capacity cannot capture its social value, firms will tend to undersupply the market. "The crux of the regulatory problem is that, a priori, there is no normal utilization rate for taxis, and no concomitant normal level of service quality, as measured by expected waiting time" Douglas, supra note 102 at 116,122-3; Frankena & Pautler, supra note 47 at 57; Schreiber supra note 47 at 274. The impact of firm capacity changes on market-wide wait times is sometimes referred to as a "negative externality" research clearly rejected the hypothesis that unregulated taxi markets would set welfare maximizing price and output levels.
Taxi deregulation was tried in 17 cities and failed to produce any efficiency or consumer benefits. Taxis were partially deregulated in 17 cities in the late 70s/early 80s, 107 but 15 of the 17 cities (all but the two smallest) quickly restored most of the previous regulations 108 when efficiency and consumer benefits failed to appear. These changes closely followed the model of longhaul liberalization (most administrative controls on pricing and market entry were eliminated, but all rules governing licensing, insurance, financial reporting and safety remained in place) although there had never been any independent studies showing how the changes would improve efficiency or service. While the supply of taxis increased initially in most markets, later studies by the Urban Mass Transit Administration showed that these gains had been economically unsustainable, 109 demand increases were modest (and sometimes negative), vehicle utilization and revenue productivity fell, 110 and fares rose faster in these cities than in comparable markets that had not been deregulated.
111 New capacity did not help the neighborhoods with poor service; it heavily focused on the airport and downtown markets that had always been the most profitable for drivers (because of much lower backhaul costs) and thus already had the best service. 112 The failure of taxi deregulation was further confirmed by a new set of academic papers were published in the late 80s and 90s, incorporating findings from these 17 cities and extending some of the theoretical analysis from earlier papers. 13 No one could produce evidence that eliminating or reforming any specific rules would directly lead to lower prices or improved service, and until Atlanta and Indianapolis became open entry cities in 1965 and 1973 . Between 1979 and 1983 they were joined by Fresno, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Madison, Milwaukee, Norfolk, Oakland, Phoenix, Portland, Sacramento, San Diego, Seattle, Spokane, Tacoma, and Tucson. Some cities, most notably Washington, had always had open entry, but regulated prices; there had never been any evidence that these open-entry cities had better or more efficient service than cities that regulated both price and entry. Charlotte and Tampa maintained longstanding entry limits but allowed the industry to change fares as long as all companies agreed to changes (i.e. open price competition was still not permitted). Price Waterhouse, Analysis of Taxicab Deregulation and Re-regulation, report prepared for the International Taxicab and Livery Association (1993); Shaw, C, Gilbert G., Bishop C, & Pruitt P., Taxicab Regulation in U.S. Cities, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (1983) . 108 8 of the 17 cities restored entry limits, and a 9th reestablished an exclusive airport taxi franchise. 6 of the other cities restored the competitive status quo ante by requiring that all new capacity be affiliated with one of the existing dispatch companies. Unfettered competition survived in only 2 of the 17 cities (Spokane and Tacoma).Shaw, Gilbert, et al, supra note 107 at 37, Price Waterhouse, supra note 107 at [28] [29] [30] Dempsey, Paul, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation, and Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure. TRANSPORTATION LAW JOURNAL, 24(1 ),115-16 (1996) . 109 In Indianapolis, taxi supply actually declined 7% as 20% of the licenses available prior to deregulation had never been taken up, and most new entry was simply the redistribution of licenses held by a company that had gone bankrupt to the people who used to drive for it. Supply then declined further; many of the new license holders had limited business skills, had (like the entrants of the 1920s) been pricing below cost and exited when they could not make basic maintenance and insurance payments. DeLeuw, Cather & Co., The Indianapolis Experience with Open Entry in the Taxi Industry, report prepared for the Urban Mass Transit Administration, 9,14 (1980) . 110 In Phoenix cab supply increased 46% but traffic fell 12% and utilization (trips per day per cab) fell 34%. Teal, R., Berglund, M., & Nemer, T., Urban Transportation Deregulation In Arizona, report prepared for the Urban Mass Transit Administration, 9,14 (1986 316-333 (1996) . While academics continued to find a number of specific regulatory practices problematic, but there was no evidence that the industry's major problems were caused by regulators.
Uber all large US cities continued to follow either the traditional regulatory model, or a regime that combined most aspects of traditional regulation with more liberal entry rules. 14 3. How can Uber achieve unregulated industry dominance given uncompetitive economics and given that all past efforts to eliminate legal/regulatory constraints failed to improve economic welfare? (3A) Unlike any previous startup, Uber organized its business development along the lines of a political campaign, following the approach laid out for a 1990s taxi deregulation campaign by libertarian think tanks Uber's pursuit of control of the market faces both "factual economic" and "democratic process" obstacles. No one can legitimately claim that consumers would achieve Google/Amazon type service/pricing gains under Uber dominance. They cannot demonstrate that Uber dominance resulted from the impartial judgement of the "market" since Uber has not shown that it can profitably produce better taxi service under competitive conditions, and the battle between fragmented, poorly capitalized incumbents and Silicon Valley billionaires able to fund billions in predatory subsidies was not impartial market competition. They have no legitimate evidence that any of the regulatory requirements they have evaded harmed consumers, have no legitimate evidence that even more limited forms of taxi deregulation would materially improve industry efficiency or consumer welfare. No democratically elected city government would openly eliminate all citizen oversight of local taxi service and grant total control of that service to private investors. Urban voters still see taxis as part of their local transport infrastructure requiring governmental oversight, and do not see it as an entirely discretionary consumer good. A government that openly relinquished control of the industry would be openly surrendering any ability to ensure that taxis are safe, and provide needed access to jobs and residents for all of the people who currently rely on them. They would also be the surrendering any ability to protect competition and to prevent market power abuses by a dominant or monopoly Uber.
From its inception, Uber correctly understood that the battle between its Silicon Valley investors and local citizens over control of the laws and regulations governing the urban car service market was a political fight 115 and had to be fought with techniques that had proven successful in political fights.
Luckily for Uber, pro-corporate/libertarian/objectivist oriented think tanks had conducted a major political campaign in the 1990s advocating the same complete elimination of all forms of legal/regulatory restrictions on the freedom of capital accumulators that Uber is seeking, and laid out a detailed communication program that Uber copied when it began its fight for market control.
The think tanks' campaign for taxi deregulation faced the same "factual economic" and "democratic process" obstacles. The think tanks could not document any industry economic evidence linking observed service and financial problems to specific regulations, and had no evidence that taxi deregulation could produce any of the tangible consumer benefits that 70s/80s longhaul deregulation had produced. The think tanks had not conducted any academic analysis refuting any of the previous findings showing that unregulated taxis would increase service and efficiency and lower prices, as had been confirmed by the failure of the real-world deregulation tests in 17 cities. Democratically elected city governments had no reason to change longstanding practices in the absence of clear evidence that they would directly lead to improved taxi service and lower fares.
The 90s think tank taxi deregulation campaign was entirely based on the type of political propaganda commonly found in large scale partisan campaigns, designed to obscure underlying agendas and motives. Relevant definitions of propaganda include a deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognition and direct behavior in ways that block interactive discussion in order to further the objective of the propagandist, 116 and communications designed to win over the public for special interests 114 Hara Associates, supra note 41. 115 "... .in particular attempts to reorder and recast the old system from scratch -and then prevent regulation from crushing the new monopolies and cartels that emerge" Kaminska, through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both their actual purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons.
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Neither this campaign nor the earlier 17 city deregulation push was the result of local citizens organizing to address local transportation issues, both were entirely organized and financed by external interests who systematically repeated its key messages across a range of contexts and publications. 118 The descriptions of the think tank taxi deregulation campaign below are based on twenty-nine articles from this period, twenty of which were published between 1993 and 2000.
119 Seventeen of the articles were primarily focused on the need for taxi deregulation; the others discussed taxi deregulation along with other urban transit and regulatory issues. Twenty-two of the pieces were published by pro-corporate/libertarian/objectivist oriented advocacy groups that received major funding from Charles and David Koch, including 6 by Reason and 5 by Sproule, J.M., CHANNELS OF PROPAGANDA ERIC Press Indiana University, 8 (1994) . 118 A review of deregulation in Seattle noted that no local consumer or civic groups had been advocating deregulation; the chief proponent was a libertarian-leaning City Council member who argued that "the best way to improve taxi service to the public was...for the government not to interfere with private industry" and justified the move in terms of the recent success of airline deregulation. Leisy, C, Taxicab Deregulation and Reregulation in Seattle: Lessons Learned, International Association of Transportation Regulators (2001) . The mayor of Indianapolis, who had driven local taxi regulation, was a close political ally of these think tanks, who published multiple papers (including one under the Mayor's byline) applauding his efforts. See Goldsmith, Moore, and Styring infra note 119.
the Institute for Justice and 8 by similar state-level groups; the others were opinion pieces in mainstream outlets that uncritically publicized the claims of those advocacy groups. The higher-level political objective these papers was defined as the "liberty principle", 121 a belief that only a very narrow range of governmental activities were legitimate, which was consistent with the Thiel/Silicon Valley political view that any governmental actions limiting the freedom of capital accumulators are illegitimate.
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The campaign worked to shift all industry discussion from a technical economic efficiency/consumer welfare frame based on industry economic evidence to a narrative where a single, simple change would dramatically transform the industry. Attractive conclusions were highlighted-their central claim that regulation is the cause of all of the industry's problems is endlessly repeated-but none of the papers presented any supporting evidence based on actual taxi industry economics. "...[MJore could be done to improve the quality of urban transportation and perhaps abate the current fiscal shortfall through the process of deregulation than through almost any other policy strategy."
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The papers all claim that ending economic regulation of taxis will lead to better quality service, lower fares, shorter wait times and increased employment, but since none of the papers even mentions concepts such as operating efficiency, utilization or productivity none of the papers can explain where these gains will come from, or how existing regulations might have caused these problems. The papers claim that deregulation will solve the problems of long wait times in peak periods and poor service to lower-income neighborhoods, but none of the authors had any understanding of the actual costs of those services and made no attempt to explain how deregulation would reduce those costs. Regulation is attacked as an obstacle to innovation, but no one can cite any specific innovations that have been blocked.
The papers reframed all industry issues around an emotive black-and-white, us-versus-them ideological/tribal battle narrative. The fictional hero was the "entrepreneur", often portrayed as a struggling immigrant anxious to embrace the free-market, who would transform taxi service but for the evils of regulation. This converted a fight for greater corporate freedom, funded by billionaires, into a fight to help an oppressed underdog. The impact of regulation on entrepreneurs "is devastating. It impairs their ability to earn a decent living for themselves and for their families. It limits their opportunity to work for themselves, instead of for others. It destroys their dream of a brighter future."
124 In reality these thwarted entrepreneurs were close to non-existent and consumers had not been harmed, since the few that did enter were not competitive with incumbents and quickly went out of business. 125 The fictional villains were the malicious forces of the "Cab Cartel" working in cahoots with corrupt government regulators. "The current regulatory scheme in Boston benefits no one but the existing medallion holders, their lobbyists, and their lawyers". 126 Framing the "heroic entrepreneur vs corrupt regulator" fight as a battle for progress, innovation and economic freedom precluded reasoned, factual discussion about alternate paths forward.
The establishment of these think-tanks as political advocacy groups by the Koch Brothers is described in chapter 5 of Mayer, Jane, DARK MONEY, Random House (2016) ; the role of Mellor in the establishment of the Institute for Justice is described at 232-3. 121 The "liberty principle", and the role these papers played in supporting it was defined by the editor of the Moore & Balaker paper (supra note 119) as the belief that any governmental activity outside the realm of police and military protections (including taxi regulation) must bear the full burden of justifying their existence, while any reduction in government activity (such as taxi deregulation) does not bear any burden of proof. Having first reframed regulatory issues into a moral battle where data was irrelevant and compromise was unacceptable, the think tanks then expanded the scope of morally unacceptable regulations from pricing and entry restrictions that had been the focus of every previous "deregulation" debate, to any rule that might ever constrain the freedom of capital. These papers specifically rejected calls "for more or "better" regulations [but] that an improved taxicab market can arise by removing regulation" 127 including regulations designed to prevent monopoly or protect public safety. 128 The think tanks insisted that giving the owners of capital complete, unfettered control of the industry would automatically eliminate any externalities and inefficiencies, implying there was no actual need to protect competition. "If it weren't for government interference, the laws of supply and demand would govern the taxi trade with almost frictionless efficiency: cabs would be plentiful, fares would be reasonable, and service would be available nearly everywhere it was wanted."
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The think tanks claimed they were just like the airline deregulation reforms of the 80s in order to obscure their much different objectives and to falsely imply taxi deregulation would produce the same large efficiency and consumer benefits. The papers included assertions such as "eliminate medallions and fares would drop, just as they did when the airlines were deregulated. " 730 or that "there is no reason, however, why the same [airline deregulation] principles cannot be successfully applied to urban transportation as well."
31 These claims were designed to create the false impression that the think tank taxi proposals were based on the same type of rigorous, evidence-based analysis as the academic research that supported airline deregulation and to conceal that their real objectives were substantially different from the limited pricing/entry changes made during airline deregulation. Other outright falsehoods included equating medallion values with monopoly rents directly extracted from consumers, 132 and claims that the failed 17 city taxi deregulation test had actually been a great success.
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The 90s think tank taxi deregulation failed to generate any support outside the ideological/political circles already predisposed against most forms of governmental activity, and thus failed to overcome the "democratic process" obstacles. Local governments and taxi industry participants may not have grasped the radical nature of the changes proposed in these papers, but knew that past deregulation efforts had failed to produce any benefits, knew that these papers had not provided any credible evidence of potential public benefits, and knew that any explicit political decision to totally abandon public oversight of taxis would be rejected by the public.
(3B) Uber adopted the think tank propaganda approach (almost word-for-word) as the foundation for its market control battle Uber immediately adapted the 90s think tank propaganda narrative as its communication template because it directly addressed the obstacles Uber would face in its pursuit of full market control. It needed to reframe all public discussion around an emotive, ideological/tribal narrative that would limit scrutiny of its uncompetitive economics and would also enlist a base of dedicated supporters, who would see Uber's battle against longstanding laws and regulations as a moral battle where compromise was unacceptable. It needed a simple regulation-based explanation for the industry problems it would allegedly solve, but did not want anyone to reexamine the actual history of taxi deregulation, or to understand the huge difference between pricing/entry liberalization and the total market control they were seeking. It needed to establish the image of a battle between cutting-edge technologists fighting to disrupt a backward industry so that people outside of its core of supporters would view Uber as the heroic good guys. Uber needed to create a strong association between its disruptive innovation and its meteoric growth in order to create the impression they were following the proven model of Amazon and other successful unicorns and thus would inevitably achieve Boroski & Mildner, supra note 119 128 Berliner, Bullock and Kramer (all supra note 119) attack regulations for mechanical inspections of taxicabs and the requirement that cab drivers obtain commercial licenses. 129 Jacoby, supra note 119. 130 Seltzer and Hardaway (both supra note 119) also argued that taxi regulation was justified by the success of airline deregulation. 131 Cevero, supra note 119. 132 Kramer, Hardaway, Moore & Balaker; all supra note 119. These claims were refuted in section 1D. 133 Most papers ignored the 17 city tests, but the ones that mentioned them cited the initial expansion of capacity, but failed to mention that the new entry was unsustainable, and that almost every city restored previous regulations. Cevero, Moore (1998), Seymour, Styring, all supra note 119. strong profitability and industry dominance just as they had. Establishing Uber as an innovative good guy with a business model just an innovative as Amazon would eliminate the need to investigate whether they actually had similarly powerful innovations, or to figure out why the losses investors were subsidizing were so large and persistent.
To build a base of ideological/tribal supporters Uber CEO Travis Kalanick emphasized the company's affinity with the tech industry and its libertarian/objectivist values. He highlighted his famous Silicon Valley investors, his use of Ayn Rand as his Twitter avatar, and described himself as a "trustbuster" and a "freedom fighter." "It's like Braveheart. Like, 'freeeeeduuuuuuuuum."
134 Uber focused on the same us-versus-them battle with entrenched and corrupt political forces, but substituted the heroic technology innovator for the heroic entrepreneur the think tanks had used. Kalanick described Uber as an avatar of progress "a transportation technology innovator, boldly going where no man has gone before;" 135 its loyal supporters would be amply rewarded in the end because "ultimately, progress and innovation win."
136 He positioned Uber and its tech industry supporters as so focused on producing cutting-edge innovations that they had never thought much about the work required to displace industry incumbents and longstanding regulations. "Our roots are technology, not politics, writing code and rolling out transportation systems...! think for too long we were sort of tech geeks that didn't realize the battle was happening." 137 Despite massive funding from Silicon Valley billionaires, Uber faced overwhelming disadvantages in its battle against a powerful "Taxi Cartel" (alternatively the "Taxi Medallion Cartel" 138 ). "Over the years, what I've come to realize is that this controversy exists because we are in the middle of a political campaign and it turns out the candidate is Uber" and the opponent is "an asshole named taxi." 139 "Our opponent -the Big Taxi cartel -has used decades of political contributions and influence to restrict competition, reduce choice for consumers, and put a stranglehold on economic opportunity for its drivers". "When we do so, we don't do so fighting anybody. The fight is brought to us by those who don't want to have to compete, don't want to innovate and who like the status quo for what it is, which is not to the benefit of consumers or drivers."" 0 Given the long-term objective of total market control, the propaganda narrative made the uphill battle with the evil Taxi Cartel into a struggle over core values where total annihilation of the enemy was a moral imperative. "Nobody likes him, he's not a nice character, but he's so woven into the political machinery and fabric that a lot of people owe him favors...We have to bring out the truth about how dark and dangerous and evil the taxi side is."
141 Kalanick made it clear that truth and justice were totally on Uber's side and any accommodation with incumbent operators or taxi regulators was out of the question. "If you're operating from strong principles, you can compromise when the person on the other side is operating from principles you respect," he says. Despite Uber's transparent interest in destroying all incumbent operators in order to establish global industry dominance, he insists Uber is just trying to increase competitive options. "When it's about protecting incumbent industry, when it's about providing less choices for citizens to get around the city, then there's less to talk about." "generated] 20,000 new driver jobs every month" 144 that had no factual basis and were totally inconsistent with actual industry economics. Uber insisted that the emergence of an unregulated, Uber dominated industry had nothing to do with multi-billion dollar subsidies but was strictly the result of the free choices of consumers in a competitive market and therefore must reflect the efficient results that markets always produce. But as law professor Eric Posner points out, "...[this] is a response that any monopolist could make...But whether or not Uber does overcharge people now, sooner or later-once it displaces taxis and dominates markets-it will." 145 Echoing the struggling immigrants in the think tank narrative, it valorized its "driver-partners" as "small business entrepreneurs" 146 who had been generously granted a unique opportunity. Uber forced drivers to bear much greater costs than traditional taxi drivers faced, could fire their "driver-partners" at will, and aggressively lied to them about their true earnings potential 147 , but Kalanick defended these actions as a way to empower workers. "When you empower drivers to own and operate their own vehicles, they can take control over their own income, their hours, and they can improve their lives." 148 Peter Thiel insisted that the monopolies that capitalists like him were developing benefited society. "By "monopoly," I mean the kind of company that is so good at what it does that no other firm can offer a close substitute. Google is a good example....Creative monopolists give customers more choices by adding entirely new categories of abundance to the world."
149 This elides the fact that venture capitalists like Thiel can also accumulate capital from exploitative monopolies that reduce overall economic welfare. Uber uses what it calls "Travis' Law" to portray itself as a beneficial, creative company just like Google and that governments questioning its march to industry dominance could only be motivated by a desire to prevent society from realizing the innovative benefits it is creating: "Our product is so superior to the status quo that if we give people the opportunity to see it or try it, in any place in the world where government has the responsibility to be at least somewhat responsive to the people, they will demand it and defend its right to exist." business model that was based on cutting-edge technological innovation; it has created a totally new product category ("ridesharing") that is totally different from traditional taxis and will be the foundation for a totally new industry (the "on-demand" or "sharing economy"); 153 its meteoric demand growth was the result of consumers freely choosing their vastly superior product in open, competitive markets; resistance to Uber's growth was due to the coalition of the evil Taxi Cartel and corrupt regulators who were willing to block major innovations and job creation in order to protect an inefficient status quo; that startup losses will soon give way to strong profits, just like past unicorns that rapidly grew into profitability; robust long-term growth is certain because its business model is so powerful that it can overwhelm competition in any city and any country and inevitably achieve global industry dominance and because it will become so efficient that it will significantly displace car ownership.
(3C) Uber's PR/propaganda narrative was powerfully amplified by the media There is no legitimate, verifiable economic evidence supporting any part of this PR/propaganda narrative. But the effectiveness of propaganda programs does not depend on analytical rigor, it depends on their ability to get seemingly objective outsiders to amplify the message and give it greater credibility. Unlike past startups, which avoided major PR spending until a profitable market position has been secured, Uber made communication a major spending priority from day one. The media had completely ignored the 1990s think tank propaganda's explicit attacks on all aspects of taxi regulation, but when the exact same narrative was repackaged in the context of an epic power struggle where cutting edge technologists backed by the best and brightest in Silicon Valley would inevitably overwhelm a backward industry, it became widely repeated in the tech industry and mainstream business press as if it was established truth that had been independently verified.
Uber's narrative exploited the myopia of tech industry journalists embedded in a Silicon Valley tribal culture that saw itself as the avatar of economic progress, who readily endorsed the framing of Uber's heroic battle against a backward industry. Given the awesome benefits that Silicon Valley-led "disruptive innovation" would inevitably bring, there was never any need to interview anyone knowledgeable about the industry being disrupted, or consider whether the Uber's claimed innovations had ever transformed any other industry. Journalists focused on the wealth and status of Uber's Silicon Valley investors within the venture capital world; the presumption they must know what they are doing eliminated the need to find evidence that would explain how they had found tens of billions of economic value no one else had ever seen, or whether their interests coincided with any broader economic interests.
Since Uber's narrative provided a fully self-contained explanation of its inevitable success, even journalists without strong tribal tech industry ties had little need to undertake any independent investigation. Given Uber's overwhelming financial advantage, one could assume the battle had been decided before it started, and thus there was no need to dig into complicated industry issues to figure out how the competition might turn out. The press treated Lyft (with a mere $2 billion in funding) as an also-ran and the entire incumbent taxi industry as a complete irrelevancy. Given its rapid growth, journalists accepted the Uber narrative implication that it was following the exact model that Amazon and Ebay had followed. The massive industrywide losses caused by the massive increase in less efficient capacity was never considered newsworthy, and was never blamed on Uber; since Amazon and Ebay had converted large initial losses to sustainable profits there was no reason to doubt that Uber would as well. And since the emergence of the next Amazon/Ebay caliber tech giant would be a major story, this perception increased the amount of highly likeable or not. Edward Bernays argued that propaganda was simply the "mechanism by which ideas are disseminated on a large scale," was central to all public relations practices, and (like all of education, business and politics) was not inherently ethical or unethical. Bernays, Edward, PROPAGANDA, Routledge (1928) 20, 133. 53 While Uber can reasonably be called an "on-demand" service, the woman whose 2010 book initially popularized the "sharing economy" term insisted Uber did not qualify, as its business model was not fundamentally based on collaborative sharing of under-utilized resources with the primary purpose of creating gains for the owners of those resources. favorable press Uber received. It also meant that the press ignored the question of whether Uber actually had the Amazon-like scale economies needed to eventually achieve profitability, and ignored the arithmetic showing that an Uber recovery from its multi-billion dollar losses would constitute one of the greatest corporate turnarounds in history.
Uber's us-versus-them narrative provided built in responses to critics; people who raised questions about driver financing risks or whether the app was actually a technological breakthrough or Uber's eventual profitability could be dismissed as an opponent of innovation and empowerment and progress; people complaining about Uber's ruthless behavior and disregard for legal requirements were bleeding hearts who did not understand what was required to create billions in corporate value. The combination of Uber's aggressive PR efforts, and a weak, disorganized and marginalized opposition created the impression that there was only one side to this story.
Of the thousands of Uber stories in the mainstream press, none included any interviews with independent experts on urban transport, none investigated the pros and cons of the longstanding taxi regulations Uber was disobeying, none explained why taxi operators couldn't profitably provide ample capacity on Saturday night, and none investigated whether "innovations" like Uber's app or surge pricing practices had ever driven major competitive changes in any other industry. Since Uber was popular (and traditional cab service was decidedly unpopular) with many of the urban elites who were a major audience for these media outlets, there was little motivation to expose the unsustainable subsidies that popularity possible, or to point out that the service they liked was reducing the already poor working conditions of drivers and also threatened affordable late night taxi service for low-wage workers.
Dozens of prestige, mainstream outlets readily adopted Uber's framing of a moral battle against evil taxi incumbents that would produce wonderful benefits for consumers. A 2012 Atlantic article claimed Uber would solve all of the problems with taxi service in Washington, D.O (long waits when it rains, poor service to African-American neighborhoods), and claimed the problems were entirely caused by regulations such as the medallions taxi owners used to exploit consumers, even though Washington never had medallions or any other entry limits. Aside from vague references to Uber's "innovative technology", there no explanation of how Uber could profitably provide both increased service and better quality cabs. The only support for the claim that regulation was the cause of poor taxi service was an approving quote from a representative from the Institute for Justice. 154 A 2014 Washington Post article described the fragmented, undercapitalized industry as a powerful monopoly, and framed the industry turmoil as the effort of medallion holders to block "new technology" in order to protect ill-gotten gains, while failing to explain that tradeable medallions were rare and had no impact on taxi consumers. There was no explanation of whether Uber could actually produce a superior service except for anecdotes about a single low-income Chicago customer, and no effort to explain how they could produce superior service except for an approving quote from an Institute for Justice lawyer. The author told her readers that the idea that Uber should be subject to local regulations was laughable because "regulations intended for taxis don't apply to a service no one could have envisioned when the laws were written."
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The main technology writer for the New Yorker told his readers that everyone opposed to Uber was a "Luddite" but failed to cite the arguments of any actual Uber opponent, and his entire justification for defending Uber as a paradigm of technological progress was the assertion that "the sharing economy is the natural next step in the evolution of markets."
156 When the main technology writer for the New York Times noticed in 2016 the failure of dozens of "sharing economy" startups with on-demand apps that hoped to become the "Uber of other markets, it did not occur to him that the repeated failure to find a way to profitably use smartphone apps to rapidly fulfill consumer desires might suggest that the grandiose claims for "ondemand" and "sharing economy" firms might not have a solid economic foundation. Instead, he attacked the failed startups for failing to meet the standard of "Uber, the hypersuccessful granddaddy of on-demand apps" without explaining how a company losing $2-3 billion a year qualified as "hypersuccessful". Having accepted Uber's narrative that it succeeded in the marketplace against "a customer-unfriendly protectionist racket that http://ww\\newyorkerxom/tech/eIements/the-long-history--of-the-fight-against-uber artificially inflated prices and cared little about customer service" and ignored issues such as profitability and competitiveness, he reasserted his baseless 2014 claims that Uber had become "a credible alternative to owning a car." 157 A full length book on Uber and Airbnb by the senior executive editor for technology at Bloomberg News provides a full overview of Uber's corporate history without ever addressing the questions of whether Uber will ever be profitable, why Uber has raised so much more money and has a valuation vastly larger than any previous startup, where Uber's investors believe returns on their $13 billion investment will come from, what Uber's long-term growth potential in the car service market might be, or how Uber's recent investments in driverless cars might succeed. The book completely ignores Uber's multi-billion dollar operating losses or the major cutbacks in Uber driver compensation, even though these were stories reported by the author's colleagues at Bloomberg.
While the book provides absolutely no economic evidence about Uber's business model, it manages to endorse every component of Uber's PR/propaganda narrative. The book insists that Uber's growth was based on powerful technological innovation.
158 suggests that Uber's ultra-powerful business model will work anywhere in the world and will eventually displace car ownership, 159 describes Uber's heroic fight against "the big taxi cartel" and corrupt regulators 160 and wants readers to believe that Uber's losses will soon give way to robust profits, just like past tech unicorns. 161 The author actually describes how he had won the cooperation of Kalanick and Uber by promising that his book would tell the story Uber wanted told, and the narrative would feature backward politicians and regulators protecting "the big taxi guys" while Uber struggles to roll out its innovative new product. "If you want people to embrace a radical future in which they give up their cars you have to allow journalists to explain and demystify your story. If you want to change the way cities work, Uber must be understood."
162 Uber has been a legitimately important story in the tech industry and general business press; this book illustrates Uber's skill at limiting journalist access to the company to the individuals who would actively amplify their desired narrative.
To date, none of the growing body of objective contrary evidence has led any of the journalists who have embraced Uber's narrative over the years to publicly admit to any doubts. The complete failure of Uber China has not led to any stories about how Uber's expectations of global dominance won't ever be achieved. Billion dollar cuts in the compensation of Uber's "driver-partners" has not led anyone to note that its initial commission rates may have been unsustainable, or to wonder whether initial customer prices and service levels might also have been unsustainable. The failure of every other "Uber of X" on-demand startup has not led any Uber supporters to reexamine where the competitive power of its business model might actually come from. Ongoing reports of massive losses, terrible margins and Uber's ongoing refusal to expose itself to full capital market scrutiny have not led anyone to reconsider whether expectations of rapid Amazon/Facebook-type "growth into profitability" were justified, or whether Uber really represents the "avatar ..the post-Google, post-Facebook era of innovation that allowed the digital realm to expand into the physical one" "The meeting thrust Kalanick into the thick of the familiar battle between new technology and the old, outdated ways of doing things." Stone, THE UPSTARTS, supra note 45, pp.7,122. 159 "Even Uber's most fervent supporters had not grasped the true potential of the business. Uber wasn't just taking passengers out of yellow cabs, it was growing the overall market for paid transportation.";/d. p.251 160 "Uber's expansion also measured the will of local governments to update antiquated transportation laws for a service that many of its own citizens desperately wanted. This was a litmus test for democracy, exposing whether regulators and legislators were more beholden to their own people or to powerful taxi interests and unions." Id. p.300.
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"Uber had discovered what startup gurus call the virtuous circle, the links between various parts of its business. Lower prices led to more customers and more frequent usage, which led to a larger supply of cars and busier drivers, which enabled Uber to further cut prices and put more pressure on competitors." Id. p.251 justified, or whether Uber really represents the "avatar of innovation and progress" tech industry ideal. It is much easier to lay out a convincing-sounding narrative for readers than to do the investigative work needed to help those readers understand economic reality. The most common response to evidence contradicting Uber's taxi industry narrative has been a new narrative based on Uber's inevitable domination of the future driverless car industry.
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(3D) Uber's willingness to exercise ruthless, raw power was a key component of its political battle for market control and fully aligned with its overall business strategy Uber knew its battle for market control was a political battle and correctly understood that perceptions about competing levels of raw power are decisive in many political battles. The 90s think tanks were easily ignored because they could not back their demands with either legitimate evidence of powerful public benefits, or raw political power. Uber's propaganda program had convinced the media that its march to industry dominance would inevitably be successful. Uber's supplemented this by establishing a hyper-ruthless corporate image, designed to convince any competitors, local governments or unconvinced journalists that any efforts to resist Uber's inevitable dominance would be futile. Uber established public claims as to why longstanding regulations did not apply to them, demonstrated that local officials were powerless to enforce those regulations when Uber openly disobeyed them, and demonstrated it had the lobbying resources to eliminate the remaining vestiges of those regulations.
Uber's ruthless behavior towards competitors, local politicians and outside critics was entirely calculated and was entirely consistent with every other aspect of its strategic pursuit of market control. By publicizing its ruthless behavior 164 Uber underscored its propaganda framing of an "us against them" battle for supremacy where compromise was impossible, strengthened support from those with an anti-government/objectivist worldview, signaled its total commitment to earning returns for its investors, and gave pause to outsiders who might have challenged its pursuit of global industry dominance. 165 In its early startup phase, Uber operations were originally limited to lightly-regulated "black-car" limo services, but its expansion across the entire taxi market led to a campaign of willful, open disregard of local taxi regulations. This civil disobedience began in 2010, four months after Uber's initial launch, when it refused to respond to a cease and desist order from the California Public Utility Commission and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, and publicized its disregard for the agencies with a Twitter/email campaign. "It is Kalanick who champions the company's critically important strategy of taking UberX into new markets without first asking permission from local regulators....It is Kalanick who emboldens his lieutenants to reject local orders to shut them down and instead to fight back." 166 A former Uber employee explained that "...it's not just that Uber has adopted the business school maxim "Don't ask for permission; ask for forgiveness"-it has instituted a policy of asking for neither." 167 Kalanick told reporters "there's been so much corruption and so much cronyism in the taxi industry and so much regulatory capture that if you ask for permission upfront for something that's already legal, you'll never get it." 168 Uber was not only disobeying 13 pricing and entry rules, but driver screening, licensing and insurance requirements, 169 and Uber benefitted from evading costs that its competitors were still obligated to incur.
In rejecting the idea that they should be required to obey existing laws, Uber kept "flipping the defaults" 170 in public arguments, insisting the problem is the laws don't match up well with Uber's incredibly innovative product, and insisting that the general public had the burden of proof for demonstrating why innovative technologically driven companies needed to obey "outdated" insurance, pricing and safety rules. Its technology was so powerful it could eliminate any public safety risks, and thus the need for any regulations protecting safety.
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To justify the claim that Uber was a totally different type of business than Yellow Cab, it began calling its business "ridesharing" to support its claim that the huge difference between paying for a ride in an Uber and paying for a ride in a taxi justified having a substantially reduced legal/regulatory regime. 172 It knew that when local politicians and regulators finally figured out the real issues were political, not technological, they would have become "too big to ban." 173 Uber was steadily attacked for pushing the boundaries of rules governing independent contractors while exerting employee-type controls over them. Uber simply decided to invent novel justifications for interpreting the law in especially favorable ways, and dare public officials to mount difficult enforcement efforts. It initially claimed that it was not a transportation company at all, but just a passive intermediary between independent, entrepreneurial drivers and their customers. ""Are we American Airlines or are we Expedia? It became clear, we are Expedia," 174 however, is strategic and manipulative, and it's meant to undermine local needs and effective governance." 181 Uber quickly realized that the battle to vanquish evil, corrupt government officials it had promised to wage would be risky and difficult, and began investing huge sums to directly lobby those evil, corrupt government officials. A 2013 article describes early lobbying efforts in New York, Chicago, Boston, Denver, Houston, Washington and Baltimore. 182 In Florida and California where local regulation included fewer of the loopholes Uber had exploited elsewhere, lobbying efforts convinced the state legislatures to strip local governments of the regulatory authority over Uber and other "transportation network companies" (TNCs), while preserving the local regulations that imposed higher costs on Uber's competitors. 183 The San Francisco taxi regulator who had been politically outmaneuvered said "Here I am, trying to steer the Titanic and someone hits me over the head with a baseball bat, is pretty much what the TNC issue is like. We were about to clear, and all of a sudden here comes billions of dollars of venture capital for people who are willing to break every law in the book." 184 In 2014 Uber escalated its lobbying efforts, bringing in high-powered political operatives who had worked at the highest levels of government into senior management, including David Plouffe, Barack Obama's former Chief of Staff, and Rachel Whetstone, who had been a major advisor to British Prime Minister David Cameron. 185 California had a larger lobbying team than any bank. 187 The key was getting state legislatures to take regulatory authority away from the cities that had the most direct interest in local taxi service. At the end of 2014 three states had passed legislation that largely exempted Uber from the regulations traditional taxis still faced; at the end of 2015 28 states had pro-Uber regulations in place.
188
The political battle between Uber's Silicon Valley investors and individual local governments was as hopelessly one-sided as the market battle against fragmented traditional taxi operators, especially since Uber's PR/propaganda efforts had eliminated most local media as a source of independent analysis. Local governments failed to understand the existential threat Uber posed to the concept of industry oversight, just as taxi owners failed to recognize that Uber was dedicated to driving them all into bankruptcy. Local officials often assumed that (like most startups) Uber was just trying to secure market access, and that it newfound willingness to negotiate via lobbyists meant a willingness to compromise. In fact Uber remained totally focused on its longer term objectives of dominance and industry control, and reneged on or litigated many of the compromises establishing much more limited regulation than traditional taxis face. 189 Uber pulled out all the stops whenever city officials such as New York Mayor Bill deBlasio openly demanded that Uber be subject to meaningful oversight 190 and demonstrated its ability to easily quash determined opposition. 191 When cities such as Portland, Boston and Philadelphia attempted to enforce existing licensing and insurance laws, Uber developed software to block law enforcement efforts. 192 When Austin required all car service providers to conduct fingerprint-based background checks on drivers, Uber and Lyft spend $8 million on an initiative to overturn the rule, and when Austin voters rejected their demand to eliminate background checks, they shut down operations, throwing all their "driver-partners" out of work.
193
Uber's strategic deployment of ruthlessness went well beyond regulators. It worked to sabotage both the fundraising and operations of Lyft and other competitors 1 and initiated specific programs to intimidate outsiders who might challenge the growing perception of inevitable world domination. Uber executive Emil Michaels "suggested that the company should consider hiring a team of opposition researchers to dig up dirt on its critics in the media -and specifically to spread details of the personal life of a female journalist who has criticized the company." 195 Uber later hired ex-CIA personnel to investigate the people who had filed an antitrust suit against its surge pricing practices, and then lied about its actions to the judge hearing the "", 196 case.
Again, Uber represents a radical departure from past tech unicorns. Whatever Amazon's strengths and weaknesses as a company, it did not demonize incumbent booksellers, threaten to publicize the personal lives of critical journalists, design software to obstruct local law enforcement or make false claims about medallions, cartels, the $90,000 annual earnings of its independent contractors. Amazon's growth was based on providing retail services more efficiently than the competitors it was driving out of business, and was not based on massive PR expenditures designed to prevent outsiders from understanding their actual competitiveness, or on massive lobbying programs led by close advisors to Presidents and Prime Ministers.
Uber's ruthless, "we are above the law" behavior was (and is) central to their business model and they could not have achieved their huge growth and valuation without it. None of these actions materially improved short-term profitability and most generated significant adverse publicity, and company supporters kept insisting these actions were aberrant incidents that would not be repeated. None of it was aberrant; just as Uber developed a brilliant strategy to drive more efficient taxi operators out of business, it established a strategy to nullify any potential barriers to its freedom of action. To maximize long-run rent-extraction potential, it needed to establish today that it can disobey any regulations it doesn't like, it can use surge pricing to gouge customers without limits, it can impose any conditions on drivers it wants, and it can obstruct any local efforts to investigate its lawbreaking. It established a corporate culture with a monomaniacal focus on the dominance and market control that profitability and investor returns would require. Kalanick demanded that his management team demonstrate this monomaniacal focus 197 and the ones that did would be free to pursue any unethical or illegal behavior, including egregious sexual harassment. 198 Prior to the 2017 publicity about systemic sexual harassment, none of Uber's investors ever criticized any of these actions and none of the executives involved were ever disciplined. To claim that this problematic behavior could be surgically extracted from an otherwise economically healthy, welfare enhancing business model requires evidence of an economically healthy, welfare enhancing business model that does not exist.
Conclusion-Would Uber's anticipated success in dominating and controlling urban car service markets increase industry efficiency and overall economic welfare?
Uber has not introduced any breakthrough technical or process innovations and has done nothing to economically "disrupt" the economics of producing urban car services. But Uber has the potential to become one of the most innovative, disruptive companies in American history.
Uber is disrupting the longstanding concept that business/corporate development is a marketplace/economic process, where success requires significant service/efficiency advantages over competitors, and where success will be determined by consumers in competitive markets based on reliable information about relative price and quality. Uber is also disrupting the longstanding concept that taxis are an important part of urban transport infrastructure, and that urban citizens have the right to establish political oversight of urban car services to protect their interests in those transport services as well as interests in safety, competition, nondiscriminatory access to prices and service and other issues affecting economic welfare.
Uber has introduced a number of major innovations that represent a major departure from prior venture capital funded unicorns. It has shown how a staggeringly large investment base can undermine the normal workings of market competition can actually shift so that resources get allocated to less efficient uses. It has shown how a well-financed propaganda program can replace the price/quality signals markets normally use to effectively allocate resources with artificially manufactured information and also allow its private investors to evade the longstanding laws and regulations. These investors are now poised to seize control of this portion of urban transport infrastructure without any formal, public decision subject to democratic processes authorizing this transfer of control. Uber has demonstrated how investors can create tens of billions of private corporate value out of thin air, without providing any material, sustainable benefits for the rest of society.
The major findings of this paper include:
The growth of Uber to date has significantly reduced economic welfare. Financial data shows that Uber is nowhere close to being able to earn sustainable profits in competitive markets, with $2 billion in operating losses in 2015, and $3 billion in 2016. Analysis of taxi industry cost structures shows that Uber is a much less efficient producer of urban car services than the traditional operators it has been driving out of business. Nothing in Uber's business model fixes any of the industry's main service problems (such as the extremely high cost of providing peak capacity), none of Uber's claimed innovations have any material impact on overall cost competitiveness, and none have ever led to competitive transformations of any other industry
Since Uber cannot rapidly grow into profitability, it will continue to reduce economic welfare in the future. Nothing in the urban car service industry cost structure, or in Uber's business model produces the type of powerful scale or network economies that allowed other prominent companies to quickly reverse early startup losses. Uber's financial results since 2012 show none of the rapid operating margin improvement one would see if it had any of these scale/network economies.
Uber's growth is due to predatory competition financed by investor subsidies. Uber's $13 billion investment base has funded uneconomical^ higher levels of service at uneconomical^ low prices. These subsidies provide a temporary consumer benefit, but they are not sustainable, and the benefit is more than offset by the welfare loss from destroying operators who are more efficient but cannot withstand years of subsidies from Silicon Valley billionaires. Uber's pursuit of global industry dominance would reduce economic welfare further. Monopoly power and sustainable rent-extraction have always been seen as a major potential source of the outsized returns Uber's investors need to justify their large, risky investment. The statements and actions of Uber's investors and managers show they have always been focused on achieving industry dominance. Unlike other successful startups that could fund much of their growth from efficiency-driven cash flow, Uber's investors knew that their drive for dominance would require substantially greater funding-1600 times the pre-lPO funding Amazon required. Uber's recent unilateral cuts to driver compensation in the US, which transferred roughly $1 billion from drivers to Uber's shareholders, demonstrates Uber's understanding of how the elimination of competition is critical to increased profitability and investor returns.
Uber is seeking total market control, a much more extreme industry structure change than deregulation, in order to maximize the potential for exploiting anti-competitive market power. Given Uber's multi-billion dollar operating losses, it is unclear whether sustainable profits and investor returns would be possible without the freedom to exploit anti-competitive market power, and Uber developed a strongly coherent strategy based on political propaganda to support this objective. Uber has fought to protect its right to use a number of techniques (such as extreme surge pricing) that add limited value in competitive markets and often generate adverse publicity, but could be major drivers of rent-extraction in the absence of competition. Total market control would eliminate the ability of consumers to fight back against market power abuses due to the loss of competition, and eliminate the ability of cities to address the reduced utility of a taxi industry that was now solely focused on maximizing returns to capital.
Nothing in Uber's PR/propaganda narrative is supported by objective, verifiable economic evidence. Uber's competitive strength and valuation cannot be justified by powerful, cutting edge technological innovation. It has not invented a totally new "ridesharing" product or pioneered an entirely new "on-demand" industry as no other company has established a viable business in either space. Its growth does not reflect the efficiency of competitive markets based on consumers freely choosing which company offers the superior product. The incumbent industry had many shortcomings but it was not a monopoly or a cartel protected by corrupt regulators, and nothing in Uber's business model solved the industry's biggest problem, the high cost of peak and low-density service. The economics of Uber and the urban car service industry are very different from the economics of other recent successful startups like Amazon and Facebook, and there is no reason to assume that the factors that drove their ability to rapidly grow into profitability and dominate their markets apply to Uber. As the complete failure of Uber China and Uber weaknesses in other overseas markets illustrates, Uber's business model is not so amazingly powerful that it will work everywhere, and thus worldwide Uber dominance is not inevitable. Uber cannot produce car service as cheaply as a reasonably run Yellow Cab operation, and there is no possibility that its efficiencies will drive years of robust growth, and will eventually drive the cost of taxi service so low that it displaces private car ownership. Given Uber's success to date, there is little basis for imagining that a major obstacle to Uber's objective of gaining control of the industry, and achieving the freedom to exploit the anti-competitive market power will suddenly appear. Uber has demonstrated that no competitive, political or media forces have any ability to impose restraints or discipline on a company with $13 billion in financing and a monomaniacal focus on maximizing the eventual returns on that investment, and it can engage in activities such as competitor sabotage, journalist intimidation, obstruction of justice and systemic sexual harassment to whatever extent it sees fit. Uber, if it achieves industry dominance, will not only have vanquished incumbent operators and local regulators, but will have triumphed over those who believe that resources should be ideally be allocated by competitive markets on the basis of superior economics, who believe that alternative industry structures can only be judged in terms of impacts on efficiency and consumer welfare. It is unclear at this point whether Uber's model, if proven successful, could be readily replicated in other industries, but many investors will undoubtedly pursue that possibility.
